3nd Army Polish Forces

Sniper training.

The history of the Polish Army in the East is connected with the combat route of the 1st Polish Army from Warsaw through the Pomeranian Val, Kolobrzeg to Berlin. The tragic battles of the 2nd Polish Army near Bautzen remain somewhat in the shadows. On the other hand, the short period of existence of the 3rd Polish Army is known only to a small group of scientists and enthusiasts. This article aims to tell the history of the formation of this forgotten army and recall the terrible conditions in which the Polish soldiers called up by the communist authorities had to serve.

The year 1944 brought the Wehrmacht great defeats on the Eastern Front. It became obvious that the occupation of the entire territory of the Second Polish Republic by the Red Army was only a matter of time. In accordance with the decisions taken at the Tehran Conference, Poland was to enter the Soviet sphere of influence. This meant the loss of sovereignty by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The legitimate government of the Republic of Poland in exile did not have the political and military power to turn the tide of events.

At the same time, Polish communists in the USSR, gathered around Eduard Osobka-Morawski and Wanda Wasilewska, began to form the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKNO), a puppet government that was supposed to take power in Poland and exercise it in the interests of Jozef Stalin. Since 1943, the communists have consistently formed units of the Polish Army, later called the "People's" Army, which, fighting under the authority of the Red Army, had to legitimize their claims to leadership in Poland in the eyes of the world community. .

The heroism of the Polish soldiers who fought on the Eastern Front cannot be overestimated, but it is worth remembering that from the middle of 1944 the war was lost for Germany, and the participation of the Poles in the military struggle was not a decisive factor in its course. The creation and expansion of the Polish Army in the East was primarily of political importance. In addition to the aforementioned legitimation in the international arena, the army strengthened the prestige of the new government in the eyes of society and was a useful tool of coercion against independence organizations and ordinary people who dared to oppose the Sovietization of Poland.

The rapid expansion of the Polish Army, which took place from mid-1944 under the slogans of fighting Nazi Germany, was also a form of control over patriotic men of military age so that they would not feed on the armed underground for independence. Therefore, it is difficult to perceive the "people's" Polish Army as nothing more than a pillar of communist power in non-sovereign Poland.

The Red Army enters Rzeszow - Soviet IS-2 tanks on the streets of the city; August 2, 1944

Expansion of the Polish Army in the second half of 1944

The entry of the Red Army into the eastern outskirts of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth made it possible to mobilize the Poles living on these lands into their ranks. In July 1944, the Polish troops in the USSR numbered 113 soldiers, and the 592st Polish Army was fighting on the eastern front.

After crossing the Bug line, the PKVN issued a political manifesto to Polish society, announced on July 22, 1944. The place of the announcement was Chelm. In fact, the document was signed and approved by Stalin in Moscow two days earlier. The manifesto appeared in the form of an announcement along with the first decrees of the Polish National Liberation Committee as a provisional authority. The Polish government-in-exile and its armed arm in Poland, the Home Army (AK), condemned this self-proclaimed statement, but, given the military superiority of the Red Army, failed to bring about the overthrow of the PKKN.

The political exposure of the PKWN provoked further expansion of the Polish Army. In July 1944, the Polish Army in the USSR was merged with the People's Army - a communist partisan detachment in Poland, and the High Command of the Polish Army (NDVP) with brig. Michal Rola-Zymerski at the helm. One of the tasks set by the new commander-in-chief was the expansion of the Polish Army by recruiting Poles from areas east of the Vistula. According to the original development plan, the Polish Army was to consist of 400 1 people. soldiers and create your own operational alliance - the Polish Front, modeled on Soviet fronts such as the 1st Belorussian Front or the XNUMXth Ukrainian Front.

During the period under review, strategic decisions regarding Poland were made by Józef Stalin. The idea of ​​creating the Polish Front of Rolya-Zhymerski1 was presented to Stalin during his first visit to the Kremlin on July 6, 1944. matter. Not without the help of Soviet partisans, who organized the plane, but at the same time carried their wounded comrades on board. The first attempt was unsuccessful, the plane crashed while trying to take off. General Rola-Zhymersky emerged from the disaster unharmed. On the second attempt, the overloaded plane barely left the airfield.

During an audience in the Kremlin, Rola-Zymerski ardently convinced Stalin that if Poland received weapons, equipment and personnel assistance, she would be able to raise an army of a million that would defeat Germany together with the Red Army. Referring to his calculations based on the pre-war mobilization capabilities of the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Rolya-Zhymersky imagined the Polish Front as the composition of three combined arms armies. He drew Stalin's attention to the possibility of recruiting many young members of the Home Army into the ranks of the Polish Army, in which the conflict between the command staff and the soldiers was allegedly growing due to the policy of the government in exile in London. He predicted that the Polish Army of this size would be able to influence the mood of the population, reduce the importance of the Home Army in society and thus prevent the unleashing of fratricidal clashes.

Stalin was skeptical of Rol-Zhymersky's initiative. He also did not trust Poland's mobilization capabilities and the use of Home Army officers. He did not take a fundamentally binding decision on the creation of the Polish Front, although he promised to discuss this project with the General Staff of the Red Army. The excited General Rola-Zhymersky received him with the consent of the leader of the USSR.

When discussing the plan for the development of the Polish Army, it was decided that by the end of 1944 its strength should be 400 thousand people. people. In addition, Rola-Zhymerski admitted that the main documents concerning the concept of the expansion of the Polish Army would be prepared by the General Staff of the Red Army. As conceived by General Rol-Zhymersky in July 1944, the Polish Front was to consist of three combined arms armies. Soon the 1st Polish Army in the USSR was renamed the 1st Polish Army (AWP), it was also planned to create two more: the 2nd and 3rd GDP.

Each army was to have: five infantry divisions, an anti-aircraft artillery battalion, five artillery brigades, an armored corps, a heavy tank regiment, an engineering brigade and a barrage brigade. However, during the second meeting with Stalin in August 1944, these plans were adjusted. At the disposal of the 3rd AWP it was supposed to have not five, but four infantry divisions, the formation of five artillery brigades was abandoned, in favor of one artillery brigade and a mortar regiment, they abandoned the formation of a tank corps. Cover from air raids was still provided by the anti-aircraft artillery battalion. There was a brigade of sappers and a barrage brigade. In addition, it was planned to form an anti-tank artillery brigade and a number of smaller units: communications, chemical protection, construction, quartermaster, etc.

Based on the request of General Rol-Zhymersky, the Red Army Headquarters on August 13, 1944 issued a directive on the formation of the Polish Front, which was supposed to be 270 thousand people. soldiers. Most likely, General Rola-Zymerski himself commanded all the forces of the front, or at least Stalin made it clear to him that this would be the case. The 1st AWP was under the command of a major general. Sigmunt Beurling, command of the 2nd AWP was to be given to a major general. Stanislav Poplavsky, and the 3rd AWP - General Karol Swierchevsky.

At the first stage of the event, which was supposed to last until the middle of September 15, 1944, it was supposed to form the command of the Polish Front along with security units, the headquarters of the 2nd and 3rd AWP, as well as the units that were part of the first of these armies. The proposed plan could not be saved. The order from which the formation of the 3rd AWP began was issued by General Rola-Zhymersky only on October 6, 1944. By this order, the 2nd Infantry Division was expelled from the 6th AWP and the command was subordinated to the army.

At the same time, new units were formed in the following areas: Command of the 3rd AWP, together with subordinate command, service, quartermaster units and officer schools - Zwierzyniec, and then Tomaszow-Lubelsky; 6th Infantry Division - Przemysl; 10th Infantry Division - Rzeszow; 11th Rifle Division - Krasnystav; 12th Infantry Division - Zamostye; 5th sapper brigade - Yaroslav, then Tarnavka; 35th pontoon-bridge battalion - Yaroslav, and then Tarnavka; 4th chemical protection battalion - Zamosc; 6th Heavy Tank Regiment - Helm.

On October 10, 1944, General Rola-Zhymersky ordered the formation of new units and approved the subordination of the already created third AWP. At the same time, the 3rd pontoon-bridge battalion was excluded from the 3rd Polish Army, which was transferred to the 35th pontoon brigade from the NDVP reserve: 3rd anti-aircraft artillery division - Siedlce; 4th heavy artillery brigade - Zamostye; 10th anti-tank artillery brigade - Krasnystav; 11th mortar regiment - Zamostye; 4th Measurement Reconnaissance Division - Zwierzynets; 9th observation and reporting company - Tomaszow-Lubelsky (at the army headquarters).

In addition to the above units, the 3rd AWP was supposed to include a number of other small security and security units: the 5th communications regiment, the 12th communications battalion, the 26th, 31st, 33rd, 35th communications companies , 7th, 9th automobile battalions, 7th and 9th mobile companies, 8th road maintenance battalion, 13th bridge building battalion, 15th road building battalion, as well as cadet officer courses and school political educational personnel.

Of the units mentioned, only the 4th anti-aircraft artillery division (4th DAplot) was in the final stage of formation - on October 25, 1944, it reached the state of 2007 with a planned number of 2117 people. The 6th heavy tank regiment, which was a de facto Soviet unit, was also ready for combat operations, since all equipment, including crews and officers, came from the Red Army. In addition, by November 15, 1944, another Soviet formation was to enter the army - the 32nd tank brigade with crews and equipment.

The rest of the units had to be formed from scratch. The test completion date was set for November 15, 1944. This was a serious mistake, since difficulties arose during the formation of the 2nd Polish Army, suggesting the impossibility of meeting this deadline. On the day when the 2nd AWP was supposed to go full-time, i.e. September 15, 1944, there were only 29 40 people in it. people – XNUMX% completed.

General Karol Swierczewski became commander of the 3rd AWP. On September 25, he gave command of the 2nd AWP and left for Lublin, where in the building on the street. Shpitalnaya 12 gathered around itself a group of officers who were scheduled for a position in the army command. Then they went on reconnaissance of the cities intended for the areas of formation of units. Based on the results of the inspection, General Swierczewski ordered the transfer of the command of the 3rd AWP from Zwierzyniec to Tomaszow-Lubelski and decided to deploy rear units.

The governing bodies of the 3rd AWP were formed according to the same terms as in the case of the 1st and 2nd AWP. Colonel Aleksey Gryshkovsky took command of the artillery, the former commander of the 1st Armored Brigade, Brig. Jan Mezhitsan, the engineering troops were to be commanded by brig. Antony Germanovich, signal troops - Colonel Romuald Malinovsky, chemical troops - Major Alexander Nedzimovsky, Colonel Alexander Kozhukh was at the head of the personnel department, Colonel Ignacy Shipitsa took the quartermaster's position, the army also included the Political and Educational Council. command - under the command of a major. Mechislav Shleyen (PhD, communist activist, veteran of the Spanish Civil War) and the Military Information Department, headed by Colonel Dmitry Voznesensky, an officer in the Soviet military counterintelligence.

The field command of the 3rd AWP had independent security and guard units consisting of: the 8th gendarmerie company and the 18th headquarters automobile company; the chief of artillery had at his disposal the 5th headquarters artillery battery, and Military Information was responsible for the 10th company of the information unit. All of the above units were stationed at the army headquarters in Tomaszow Lubelski. The army command also included postal, financial, workshops and repair institutions.

The process of forming the command and staff of the 3rd Polish Army, together with the services subordinate to it, proceeded slowly but consistently. Although until November 20, 1944, only 58% of the regular positions of commanders and heads of services and divisions were filled, but this did not adversely affect the development of the 3rd AWP.

Mobilization

Conscription to the Polish Army began with the decree of the Polish Committee of National Liberation of August 15, 1944 on the appointment of conscripts in 1924, 1923, 1922 and 1921, as well as officers, reserve non-commissioned officers, members of former underground military organizations, doctors, drivers and a number of other qualified individuals useful to the military.

Mobilization and registration of conscripts were to be carried out by the District Replenishment Commissions (RKU), which were created in a number of county and voivodship cities.

Most of the inhabitants of the districts where the draft took place expressed a negative attitude towards the PKWN and considered the government-in-exile in London and its delegation in the country to be the only legitimate authority. His deep disgust for the communists was reinforced by the crimes committed by the NKVD against members of the Polish underground for independence. Therefore, it is not surprising that when the Home Army and other underground organizations announced a boycott of the mobilization, the majority of the population supported their vote. In addition to political factors, the course of mobilization was influenced by the hostilities carried out in parts of the territories under the jurisdiction of each RCU.

The lack of transport hampered the work of draft commissions in cities remote from district replenishment commissions. It was also not enough to provide the RKU with funds, paper and people of appropriate qualifications.

There was not a single person in the Kolbuszovsky poviat, which was subordinate to the RCU Tarnobrzeg. The same thing happened in some powiats in RCU Yaroslav. In the area of ​​the RCU Siedlce, about 40% of conscripts refused to be mobilized. In addition, fewer people came to the rest of the RKU than expected. This situation increased the distrust of the military authorities towards the population, and people who joined the army were treated as potential deserters. Evidence of the standards that have developed in the draft boards is the testimony of one of the veterans of the 39th squad of the 10th DP:

(...) when the Russians entered and freedom was supposed there, in June-July [1944], and immediately in August there was mobilization into the army and the 2nd Army was formed. On August 16, there was already a call for military service. But what a call it was, no announcements, only posters hung on houses and only yearbooks were from 1909 to 1926, so many years went to the war at once. There was a collection point in Rudki2, then in the evening we were taken from Rudka to Drohobych. We were led by the Russians, the Russian army with rifles. We stayed in Drohobych for two weeks, because even more people were gathering, and two weeks later we left Drogobych for Yaroslav. In Yaroslav we were not stopped only after Yaroslav in Pelkin, it was such a village, we were put there. Later, officers in Polish uniforms came from there and each of the other units said how many soldiers it needed and they chose us. They lined us up in two rows and chose this, that, that, that. The officers will come and choose themselves. So one officer, a lieutenant, led five of us into the light artillery.

And that's how Cpr. Kazimierz Wozniak, who served in the mortar battery of the 25th Infantry Regiment of the 10th Infantry Division: The call took place in typical front-line conditions, to the sounds of constant cannonade from the nearby front, the howl and whistle of artillery and flying missiles. above us. November 11 [1944] we were already in Rzeszow. From the station to the barracks of the second reserve rifle regiment4 we are accompanied by a curious crowd of civilians. I was also interested in the new situation after crossing the gates of the barracks. What did I think to myself, the Polish Army, and the Soviet command, orders the lowest rank to the highest rank. These were the first shocking impressions. I quickly realized that power is often more about function than degree. In any case, I experienced it myself later, when I served on duty several times […]. After a few hours in the barracks and placing us on bare bunk beds, we were bathed and disinfected, the usual sequence of things when we moved from civilian to soldier. Classes simply began immediately, as new departments were formed and additions were required.

Another problem was that the draft boards, in an effort to secure enough conscripts for the army, often recruited the unfit for service into the army. In this way, people with poor health, suffering from numerous ailments, got into the unit. A strange fact confirming the defective work of the RCU was the sending of heavy people suffering from epilepsy or severe visual impairment to the 6th Tank Regiment.

Units and their location

The main type of tactical unit in the 3rd Polish Army was an infantry division. The formation of the Polish infantry divisions was based on the Soviet position of the Guards Rifle Division, which was modified for the needs of the Polish armed forces, including adding pastoral care. The strength of the Soviet guards divisions was the high saturation of machine guns and artillery, the weakness was the lack of anti-aircraft weapons and the lack of road transport. According to the staffing table, the division should have a staff of 1260 officers, 3238 non-commissioned officers, 6839 non-commissioned officers, a total of 11 people.

The 6th Rifle Regiment was formed by order of the commander of the 1st Polish Army in the USSR, General Berling on July 5, 1944, consisting of: command and staff, 14th, 16th, 18th rifle regiments (pp), 23rd light artillery regiment (fallen), 6th training battalion, 5th armored artillery squadron, 6th reconnaissance company, 13th engineer battalion, 15th communications company, 6th chemical company, 8th motor transport company, 7 -th field bakery, 6th sanitary battalion, 6th veterinary ambulance, artillery commander's platoon, mobile uniformed workshops, field mail No. 3045, 1867 field bank cash desk, military information department.

According to the development plans of the Polish Army, the 6th Infantry Division was included in the 2nd AWP. Difficulties that arose in the process of organizing the unit led to significant delays, as a result of which the expected completion date for the organization of the division coincided with the date of the creation of the 3rd AWP. This prompted General Rola-Zymerski to withdraw the 6th Infantry Division from the 2nd AWP and join the 3rd AWP, which happened on 12 October 1944.

On July 24, 1944, Colonel Ivan Kostyachin, Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Stefan Zhukovsky and Quartermaster Lieutenant Colonel Maxim Titarenko arrived in the formation area of ​​the 6th Infantry Division. formation of the 50th Infantry Division. Soon they were joined by 4 officers appointed as unit commanders and a group of privates. On September 1944, General Gennady Ilyich Sheipak ​​arrived, who took command of the division and held it until the end of the war. In early August 50, larger transports with people began to arrive, so the formation of infantry regiments began. At the end of August, the unit reached 34% of the number provided for in regular work. While there was no shortage of privates, there were serious shortcomings in the officer cadre, which did not exceed 15% of the requirement, and in non-commissioned officers only XNUMX% of regular posts.

Initially, the 6th Rifle Division was stationed in the Zhytomyr-Barashuvka-Bogun area. On August 12, 1944, a decision was made to regroup the 6th Infantry Division in Przemysl. In accordance with the order of General Sverchevsky, the regrouping took place from August 23 to September 5, 1944. The division moved to the new garrison by train. The headquarters, reconnaissance company, communications company and medical battalion were stationed in buildings on the street. Mickiewicz in Przemysl. The 14th Infantry Regiment developed in the villages of Zhuravitsa and Lipovitsa, the 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments and, together with other separate units, were stationed in barracks in Zasanie - the northern part of Przemysl. The 23rd stake was stationed in the village of Pikulice, south of the city.

After regrouping on September 15, 1944, the 6th Rifle Division was recognized as formed and began planned exercises. In fact, the process of replenishing personal statuses continued. The regular need for the positions of officers and non-commissioned officers was only 50% satisfied. To some extent, this was offset by a surplus of enlisted men, many of whom could be promoted to sergeants in unit courses. Despite the shortcomings, the 6th Rifle Division was the most completed division of the 3rd Polish Army, which was a consequence of the fact that the process of its formation lasted four months longer than the other three divisions in the army.

The 10th Rifle Division included: command and staff, 25th, 27th, 29th rifle regiment, 39th pile, 10th training battalion, 13th armored artillery squadron, 10th reconnaissance company, 21st engineer battalion, 19th communications company, 9th chemical company, 15th automobile and transport company, 11th field bakery, 12th sanitary battalion, 10th veterinary ambulance, artillery control platoon, mobile uniform workshop, field post No. 3065. 1886, 6. Field bank cash desk, department of military information. Colonel Andrei Afanasyevich Czartorozhsky was the division commander.

The organization of the 10th Infantry Division took place in Rzeszów and its environs. Due to the lack of premises adapted for the needs of the army, the units were quartered in different parts of the city. The command of the division occupied the building on Zamkova Street, 3. The headquarters of the 25th Infantry Regiment was located in the building of the pre-war tax office on On May 1, the 1st battalion was stationed in houses on the street. Lvovskaya, 2nd battalion on the street. Koleeva, 3rd battalion in the rear of the street. Zamkov. The 27th Infantry Regiment developed on the property of the pre-war Polish ambassador to France, Alfred Chlapowski, in the village of Slochina (shortly after its formation, the 2nd Battalion of this regiment moved to the barracks on Lwowska Street in Rzeszow). The 29th brigade was stationed in the so-called. barracks on st. Baldakhovka (in mid-October, the 1st battalion moved to a tenement house on Lvovskaya Street). The 39th pile was located as follows: the headquarters in the building on the street. Semiradsky, 1st squadron in the house near the bridge on Wisloka, 2nd squadron in the school building at the station, 3rd squadron in the buildings of the former egg cellar on the street. Lvov.

According to the plan, the 10th Rifle Division was to complete its formation by the end of October 1944, but it was not possible to save it. On November 1, 1944, the staff of the division was: 374 officers, 554 non-commissioned officers and 3686 privates, i.e. 40,7% of the staff. Although in the following days the division received the required number of privates, even beyond the established limits, officers and non-commissioned officers were still not enough. Until November 20, 1944, the staffing of officers was 39% of the regular, and non-commissioned officers - 26,7%. This was too little to consider the division formed

and fit for combat.

The 11th rifle division included: command and staff, 20th, 22nd, 24th rifle, 42nd pile, 11th training battalions, 9th armored artillery squadron, 11th reconnaissance company, 22 -th sapper battalion, 17th communications company, 8th chemical company, 16th automobile and transport company, 11th field bakery, 13th sanitary battalion, 11th veterinary outpatient clinic, artillery headquarters platoon, mobile uniform workshop , field mail No. 3066, 1888 field bank cash desk, reference department of the military.