Landing operation in the Gulf of Salerno: September 1943, part 1
Paratroopers of the US 220th Corps land in the Gulf of Salerno near Paestum from the landing craft LCI(L)-XNUMX.
The invasion of Italy began in July 1943 with the Allied landings in Sicily (Operation Husky). The next stage was the landing operation in the Gulf of Salerno, which provided a solid foothold in continental Italy. The question of why they, in fact, needed this bridgehead was debatable.
Although after the victory of the Allies in North Africa, the direction of the offensive from Tunisia through Sicily to the Apennine Peninsula seemed like a logical continuation, in fact this was by no means the case. The Americans believed that the shortest route to victory over the Third Reich lay through Western Europe. Realizing the growing presence of their own troops in the Pacific, they wanted to end the invasion across the English Channel as soon as possible. The British are the opposite. Before the landings in France, Churchill hoped that Germany would bleed to death on the Eastern Front, strategic raids would destroy her industrial potential, and he would regain influence in the Balkans and Greece before the Russians entered. However, most of all he feared that a frontal attack on the Atlantic Wall would result in losses that the British could no longer afford. So he delayed the moment, hoping it wouldn't happen at all. The best way to do this was to involve an ally in operations in southern Europe.
Spitfires from No. 111 Squadron RAF at Comiso; in the foreground is a Mk IX, in the background is an older Mk V (with three-bladed propellers).
In the end, even the Americans had to admit that - mainly due to lack of logistics - the opening of the so-called second front in Western Europe before the end of 1943 had little chance of success and that some kind of "substitute theme" was needed. The real reason for the invasion of Sicily that summer was the desire to engage the Anglo-American forces in Europe in an operation big enough that the Russians didn't feel like they were fighting Hitler alone. However, the decision to land in Sicily did not allay the doubts of the Western Allies as to what to do next. At the Trident conference in Washington in May 1, the Americans made it clear that Operation Overlord should be launched no later than May next year. The question was what to do before the ground forces, so as not to stand idle with weapons at their feet, and on the other hand, not to waste the forces that would soon be required to open a second front. The Americans insisted that in the fall of 1943, after the expected capture of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica be captured, seeing them as springboards for a future invasion of Southern France. In addition, such an operation required only limited resources and could be completed relatively quickly. However, this advantage turned out to be the most serious drawback in the eyes of many - an operation of such a small scale did not pursue any global goals: it did not pull German troops from the Eastern Front, it did not satisfy the public, thirsting for news of great victories.
At the same time, Churchill and his strategists were pushing through plans in accordance with British state sense. They shackled allies to conquer the southern tip of the Italian peninsula - not to move from there to Rome and further north, but simply to obtain base camps for invading the Balkans. They argued that such an operation would deprive the enemy of access to the natural resources located there (including oil, chromium and copper), jeopardize the supply lines of the eastern front and encourage Hitler's local allies (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Hungary) to leave the alliance with him will strengthen partisans in Greece and possibly pull Turkey over to the side of the Grand Coalition.
However, for the Americans, the plan for a land offensive deep into the Balkans sounded like an expedition to nowhere, which fetters their forces for who knows how long. Nevertheless, the prospect of a landing on the Apennine Peninsula was also tempting for another reason - it could lead to the capitulation of Italy. Support for the Nazis there was rapidly weakening, so there was a real chance that the country would exit the war at the first opportunity. Although Germany had long ceased to be a military ally, 31 Italian divisions were stationed in the Balkans and three in France. Although they played only an occupying role or guarding the coast, the need to replace them with their own army would have forced the Germans to commit the significant forces they needed elsewhere. They would have to allocate even more funds for the occupation of Italy itself. Allied planners were even convinced that in such a situation Germany would retreat, surrendering the entire country, or at least its southern part, without a fight. Even that would have been a great success - on the plain around the city of Foggia there was a complex of airports from which heavy bombers could raid oil refineries in Romania or industrial facilities in Austria, Bavaria and Czechoslovakia.
"The Italians will keep their word"
On the last day of June, General Eisenhower notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that the plan for the fall of 1943 made it dependent on the strength and reaction of the Germans and the attitude of the Italians to the ten-day period. Invasion of Sicily later.
This excessively conservative position was explained to some extent by the uncertainty of Eisenhower himself, who at that time was not yet commander in chief, but also by his awareness of the difficult situation in which he found himself. The CCS demanded that after the end of the fighting for Sicily, it send the seven most experienced divisions (four American and three British) back to England, where they were to prepare for the invasion across the English Channel. At the same time, the chiefs of staff expected that Eisenhower, after the conquest of Sicily, would conduct another operation in the Mediterranean, large enough to force the Italians to surrender and the Germans to draw additional troops from the Eastern Front. As if that weren't enough, CCS reminded that the location of this operation must be within the "protective umbrella" of its own fighters. Most of the then Allied fighter forces in this area of operations were Spitfires, whose combat range was only about 300 km. In addition, for such a landing to have a chance of success, a relatively large port and airport would have to be nearby, the capture of which would allow supplying and expanding the strongholds.
Meanwhile, news from Sicily did not inspire optimism. Although the Italians surrendered this piece of their territory without much resistance, the Germans reacted with impressive enthusiasm, making a furious retreat. As a result, Eisenhower still did not know what to do next. Only on July 18 did he request a priori consent from CCS for a possible landing in Calabria - if he made such a decision (he received consent two days later). A few days later, on the evening of July 25, Radio Rome, quite unexpectedly for the allies, reported that the king had removed Mussolini from power, replacing him with Marshal Badoglio, and thus ending fascist rule in Italy. Although the new prime minister has declared that the war continues; The Italians would keep their word, his government immediately began secret negotiations with the allies. This news instilled in Eisenhower such optimism that he believed in the success of the plan, which had previously been considered purely theoretical - landing far north of Calabria, to Naples. The operation was codenamed Avalanche (Avalanche).
