Liberation of the Baltic states by the Red Army, part 2

SS soldiers on their way to the front line of defense in the Courland pocket; November 21, 1944

On September 3, 21, the troops of the 1944rd Baltic Front, taking advantage of the success of the Leningrad Front, completed the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses to the full tactical depth. Indeed, having covered the retreat of the Narva operational group towards Riga, the German raiders in front of Maslennikov's front surrendered their positions themselves - and very quickly: the Soviet troops pursued them in cars. On September 23, formations of the 10th Panzer Corps liberated the city of Valmiera, and the 61st Army of General Pavel A. Belov, operating on the left wing of the front, withdrew to the area of ​​​​the city of Smiltene. His troops, in cooperation with units of the 54th army of General S. V. Roginsky, captured the city of Cesis until the morning of September 26.

2. Prior to this, the Baltic Front broke through the Cesis defense line, but the pace of its movement did not exceed 5-7 km per day. The Germans were not defeated; they retreated in an orderly and skillful manner. The enemy jumped back. While some troops held their positions, others who retreated prepared new ones. And each time I had to break through the enemy defenses again. And without him, the meager stocks of ammunition crumbled before our eyes. The armies were forced to break through in narrow sections - 3-5 km wide. The divisions made even smaller gaps, into which the second throws were immediately introduced. At this time, they expanded the front of the breakthrough. During the last day of fighting, they marched day and night ... Breaking the enemy's strongest resistance, the 2nd Baltic Front was slowly approaching Riga. We have reached every milestone with great effort. However, reporting to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the course of operations in the Baltic, Marshal Vasilevsky explained this not only by the difficult terrain and fierce resistance of the enemy, but also by the fact that the front was poorly protected. maneuvering infantry and artillery, he agreed with the taste of the troops for movement on the roads, as he kept infantry formations in reserve.

Baghramyan's troops at that time were engaged in repulsing the counterattacks of the 3rd Panzer Army of General Raus. On September 22, the troops of the 43rd Army managed to push back the Germans north of Baldone. Only in the zone of the 6th Guards Army, reinforced by the 1st Tank Corps and covering the left wing of the shock group of the front, on the approach to Riga from the south, the enemy managed to penetrate the defenses of the Soviet troops up to 6 km.

By September 24, German troops operating against the left wing of the Leningrad Front retreated to Riga, while at the same time fortifying themselves on the Moonsund Islands (now the West Estonian archipelago). As a result, the front of the Army Group "North", while weakened in battles, but completely retained its combat capability, was reduced from 380 to 110 km. This allowed his command to significantly condense the grouping of troops in the Riga direction. On the 105-kilometer "Sigulda" line between the Gulf of Riga and the northern coast of the Dvina, 17 divisions defended, and approximately on the same front south of the Dvina to Auka - 14 divisions, including three tank divisions. With these forces, taking up defensive positions prepared in advance, the German command intended to stop the advance of the Soviet troops, and in case of failure, withdraw Army Group North to East Prussia.

At the end of September, nine Soviet armies reached the "Sigulda" defense line and held there. This time it was not possible to break the enemy grouping, General Shtemienko writes. - With a fight, she retreated to a previously prepared line, 60-80 km from Riga. Our troops, concentrated on the approaches to the Latvian capital, literally gnawed through the enemy's defenses, methodically pushing him back meter by meter. This pace of the operation did not portend a quick victory and was associated with heavy losses for us. The Soviet command was increasingly aware that the incessant frontal attacks on the current directions did not bring anything but an increase in losses. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command was forced to admit that the operation near Riga was developing poorly. Therefore, on September 24, it was decided to shift the main efforts to the Siauliai region, which Bagramyan had asked for back in August, and strike in the Klaipeda direction.