Latest aviation plans of the Polish People's Republic

The MiG-21 was the most widespread combat aircraft of the Polish military aviation in the 70s, 80s and 90s In the photo, the MiG-21MF during exercises on the road section of the airport. Photo by R. Rohovich

In 1969, a plan was drawn up for the development of Polish military aviation until 1985. A decade later, at the turn of the seventies and eighties, a concept of an organizational structure and equipment replacement was prepared, which was to be gradually implemented until the mid-nineties.

In the decade of the 80s, the aviation of the Armed Forces of the Polish People's Republic, i.e. The National Air Defense Forces (NADF), the Air Force and the Navy, bore the burden of belated decisions to replace the generation of attack and reconnaissance aircraft and the specter of a decrease in the number of fighters. On paper, everything was fine; organizational structures were quite stable, there were still a lot of cars in the units. However, the technical characteristics of the equipment did not lie, unfortunately, it was getting old and less and less consistent with the standards that define modernity in combat aviation.

Old plan - new plan

The review of the implementation of the 1969 development plan from the point of view of the last ten years looked not bad. The necessary rearrangements were made in organizational structures, strike aviation was strengthened at the expense of fighter aircraft. Auxiliary aviation was reorganized due to the significant strengthening of the Air Force of the Ground Forces (helicopters). The sailors again turned out to be the biggest losers, since their naval aviation received neither structural reconstruction nor reinforcement of equipment. First things first.

Together with the subsequent withdrawn batches of Lim-2, Lim-5P and Lim-5 aircraft (in chronological order), the number of fighter regiments was reduced. In their place, subsequent modifications of the MiG-21 were purchased, which dominated the Polish military aviation in the 70s. Unfortunately, despite the assumptions made in that decade, to completely eliminate subsonic units, without a radar sight and Lim-5 guided missile weapons, which in 1981 were still available both in the Air Force (one squadron in the 41st PLM) and and VOK (also one squadron as part of the 62nd PLM OPK). Only the delivery of the MiG-21bis for the second regiment (34th PLM OPK) and the completion of equipping another (28th PLM OPK) MiG-23MF allowed the transfer of equipment and the final transfer of Lim-5 to training and combat units.

Our strike and reconnaissance aviation was also based on subsequent modifications of the Lima of the 70s. Lim-6M interceptors and Lim-6P interceptors were added to already flying Lim-5bis ground attack fighters after a corresponding restructuring. Due to procurement costs, Su-7 fighter-bombers were completed in only one regiment (3rd plmb), and their successors, i.e. Su-20s were completed in the status of two squadrons as part of the 7th bomber and reconnaissance aviation brigade in place of the withdrawn Il-28 bombers.

It turned out that more technically sophisticated and much more expensive imported products have a greater range and carrying capacity of attached weapons, but still they are not vehicles capable of breaking through enemy air defenses, and the command of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (ZSZ OV) pointed out their only advantage - the ability carry nuclear bombs. The Air Force Command decided that it was better to have more and cheaper vehicles, because thanks to this we meet the force standards defined by the allied "leadership".

It was similar with reconnaissance aircraft, the allied minimum of two units was complete, but the equipment was not very good. There was enough enthusiasm and money to buy the MiG-21R for only three tactical reconnaissance squadrons. In the mid-70s, only KKR-1 pallets were purchased for the Su-20. The rest of the tasks were carried out by artillery reconnaissance squadrons SBLim-2Art. It was hoped that in subsequent years it would also be possible to save on purchases in the USSR by introducing a new domestic design into service. Attempts were made to create an assault-reconnaissance and artillery variants by modernizing the TS-11 Iskra jet trainer. There was also the idea of ​​a completely new design, hidden under the designation M-16, it was supposed to be a supersonic, twin-engine combat training aircraft. Its development was abandoned in favor of the Iskra-22 subsonic aircraft (I-22 Irida).

Also in helicopter aviation, quantitative development did not always follow qualitative development. During the 70s, the number of rotorcraft increased from +200 to +350, but this became possible due to the serial production of the Mi-2 in Svidnik, which performed mainly auxiliary tasks. The small carrying capacity and cabin design made it unsuitable for the transfer of tactical troops and heavier weapons. Although weapon options were being developed, including anti-tank guided missiles, they were far from perfect and could not be compared with the combat capabilities of the Mi-24D.

Easy shortness of breath, that is, the beginning of a crisis

More serious attempts at new plans for the development of two five-year plans in the 80s began in 1978 with the definition of the main goals of the reform. For the military-industrial complex, it was planned to increase the possibilities of effective countermeasures against air attack weapons at distant approaches to defended objects, while at the same time increasing the automation of the processes of command and control of forces and means. In turn, it was planned for the Air Force to increase the capabilities of air support for troops, especially fighter-assault aircraft.

All proposals for personnel changes and technical re-equipment were considered from the point of view of meeting the requirements regarding the forces allocated to the SPZ HC. The command of these troops in Moscow received annual reports on the fulfillment of their obligations and, on their basis, sent recommendations on making structural changes or purchasing new types of weapons.

In November 1978, such recommendations were collected for the Polish Army for the five-year plan 1981-85. and compared with the plans prepared by the General Staff of the Polish Army (GSh VP). At first, both of them seemed not too demanding to be fulfilled, although it must be remembered that, first of all, they were just tests for the right program and were created during a period of not the worst economic situation in the country.

In general, the recommendations sent from Moscow suggested the purchase in 1981-85: 8 MiG-25P interceptors, 96 MiG-23MF interceptors (regardless of the 12 aircraft of this type ordered earlier), 82 fighter-bombers with reconnaissance equipment -22, 36 attack Su-25, 4 reconnaissance MiG-25RB, 32 Mi-24D attack helicopters and 12 Mi-14BT sea minesweepers.