Renault R35
Despite the shortcomings of the R35 in the Polish campaign of 1939, they could contribute to a local advantage, increasing the chances of success against the German aggressor.
The implementation of the armor expansion plan on the basis of the domestic industry should have been limited only to tanks with thin armor and could be carried out at a very slow pace (...) we could get basic armored vehicles, tanks with thick armor, only Abroad, the condition was to receive a loan, because. we didn't have the funds to buy in cash. However, despite the fact that our allies produced a large number of tanks that were good and cheaper than ours, and although we received loans for their purchase, the difficulties in acquiring this equipment were so great that before the start of the war we only received him for one battalion.
This is how the Chief of the General Staff (GSh), Lieutenant General Vaclav Stakhevich, summed up Poland's efforts to procure light tanks from France in the late XNUMXs. This quote, although quite accurately describing the realities of that time, is nevertheless a simplification and does not fully reflect the atmosphere and difficulties in decision-making that accompanied the Polish personnel officers in the second half of the XNUMXs.
General Stakhevich on October 21, 1936, in his instructions defining the combat missions of light tanks, indicated the interaction in the offensive with the infantry as the most important. This requirement, well executed by the R35, in practice was focused on quickly shifting the center of gravity of its own attack at the tactical level and giving a stronger blow where the Npl. turned out to be weak. (...) Tanks are needed when breaking through a frontal attack, but the tactical flank should be considered as part of a frontal attack.
The participation of light tanks in the defense against enemy armored units or escorting small motorized units of their own was mentioned later by the head of the border service. Changing or adding new tasks to the Polish light tank forced the introduction of single-turreted 7TP tanks with 37 mm wz. 37. These vehicles, although not designed with this in mind, became universal tanks in Poland. Domestic "seven-tracks" had to be effective both in defense and in the offensive, participate in operational maneuver and, finally, in the mobile fight against enemy tanks. Nevertheless, providing tank support for friendly forces when attacking an enemy fortified area remained a key task for the Polish light tank. The French tank R35 was best suited for this kind of task.
The R35 tanks delivered to Poland were painted in the standard colors for the French army. Prior to the German aggression against Poland, Polish vehicles were not covered with the target tricolor camouflage.
The beginning of 1939 was a very busy period in terms of tank purchases for Poland, and it even allowed some moderate optimism to develop. In the first half of March, the Polish commission saw in Prague two models of medium tanks proposed by the companies Českomoravská Kolben-Danek and Škoda. Both vehicles made such a good impression on our representatives that the concept of equipping a medium tank with domestic armor was temporarily revived. On the last day of March, the commander of the armored forces submitted to the head of the border guard a report on a visit to Czech factories, along with a positive assessment of the V8Hz and S-II-c vehicles (“Possibility of purchasing tanks abroad”, No. 1776). The topic looked promising, because, like brig. Stanislav Kozitsky - The Czech authorities were going to agree to the licensed production of cars on the Vistula River. The information from the positive commercial negotiations, the announcement of domestic testing of the vehicles, and the pre-determined delivery dates for the first medium tanks certainly had an effect on the imagination. The problem is that the next day after the end of the negotiations, the Wehrmacht entered Prague. General Kozitsky said that in view of the changed situation, the possible continuation of negotiations should be carried out by the Polish military attache in Berlin. To make such statements in front of the head of the Border Guard was an expression of great courage or lack of understanding of the current situation. Attempts to purchase V8Hz vehicles through the Swiss company A. Saurer or the Swedish Landswerk might sound more plausible. Both of these structures were well known to the Polish military authorities and, importantly, they had the appropriate licenses, hence the theoretical possibility of continuing negotiations and fulfilling the Polish order.
In practice, the only tanks available were the French R35 or D2, although the latter was the least enthusiastic among the Polish military. The assurances received in the spring from the employees of the concern about the possibility of supplying Somua S35 tanks in batches of five units per month or FCM 36 tanks did not find the slightest rebound during difficult negotiations with the military from the Seine. The French version revives quickly, already in mid-April, when six tank battalions worth about 50-70 million zlotys, numbering 300 vehicles, are increasingly appearing. However, this is still waiting, as the issue of obtaining a new loan comes to the fore. The amount remaining from the loan to Rambouillet allowed the purchase of only one battalion of tanks. In May, tanks top the list of needs for the Republic's eastern ally. On May 26, the Polish embassy in Paris asks the Warsaw headquarters to indicate which type of tank, R35 or H35, is of greatest interest to the Polish Army and whether negotiations should be negotiated with the French on both variants of a light tracked vehicle. Exactly in the middle of June, Colonel Fida telegraphed to Warsaw: General Gamelin verbally confirmed his readiness to hand over a battalion of R35 tanks with several H35s. I will send the report by courier.
On the same day, the head of the Army Administration and the 60th Deputy Minister of Military Affairs, Brig. Mieczysław Maciejowski recommends purchasing one battalion of tanks, possibly of the same type (2 vehicles) with immediate delivery, full equipment and rolling stock. The only caveat is the possibility of matching French radio stations with Polish transmitting and receiving stations N1C and N1938S. The expectation, known since 3, of the soonest delivery of vehicles of both types to the country after the platoon (XNUMX units) has been resumed to start field trials.
At the same time, Colonel Fida was informed of the departure for Paris of another Polish commission, this time headed by Colonel Eugeniusz Wyrwinski. A month later, on July 15, 1939, brig. Tadeusz Kossakowski is ordered to take over the leadership of the Polish military specialists already working on the Seine, whose goal is to obtain equipment for the army.
The new version of the instructions, prepared in June by the General Staff, says: In connection with the material loan granted to us in the amount of 430 million euros. in the form of the withdrawal of military equipment by the French army - I ask for an immediate trip to Paris with the Commission (...) The task of Mr. General will be to find out in detail about the possibilities of deliveries and dates and balance prices in relation to the next order of importance of equipment (...) The General Staff to receive 300 tanks proposed the French (such as Renault, Hotchkiss and one battalion of Somois) in the form of fully organized battles (with tails). Almost half of the amount of the new loan, i.e. 210 million French francs, was to be used for the purchase of tanks and artillery tractors. Simultaneously with the aforementioned milestones, the first batch of Renault R35 light tanks is already on its way to Poland.
On Polish soil
The words of the brigadier general. Vatslav Stakhevich, although he was right in many ways, did not reflect the hesitations and differences of opinion about the R35 tanks and their weapons that existed among the Polish top military leaders in the second half of 71.926. The decision to purchase the machines in question in France was postponed, although in part it was supported by a legitimate desire to obtain the maximum possible equipment on credit. In the end, after a series of trips and negotiations with the French side, an appropriate agreement was signed. Based on it, tanks were selected for sale. Fortunately, the Polish Army received new vehicles, from the current production of the Boulogne-Billancourt factory (order 503 D / P) or allocated from the resources of the 503rd tank regiment (503 régiment de chars de Combat, 3 RCC). Most of these machines were picked up between March 15 and June 1939 XNUMX.
All vehicles heading towards the Vistula had APX-R turrets with episcopates, although the French already had a variant with PPL RX 160 diascopes with a wider field of view than earlier versions of optical instruments. In the period from 11 to 12 July 1937, a battalion of R35 light tanks bought by Poland, together with an experimental “tail” in the form of an H35, was loaded onto the Polish cargo ship Levant, chartered from the shipowner Zhegluga Polskaya. The next day, the transport was sent to the port of Gdynia. The urgent unloading action had to bear all the signs of improvisation, as evidenced by the document “Critical remarks on the unloading of armored personnel carriers. and a car and ammunition in Gdynia from the ship "Levant" 15-17.VII.1939" dated July 27.
The list opens with the accusation that the order for the departure of delegated personnel from Warsaw to collect transport at the port was issued late, which was prepared on the morning of August 14, and unloading was to begin in the early hours of the morning. next day. A mistake or oversight made at the beginning caused a haste in the preparation of transport documentation - for example, there was no time to determine a preferential transport tariff from the PKP for quartermaster transport. It was also necessary to overcome the difficulties encountered in obtaining exemption from the payment of duties and in the choice of railway wagons (platforms) due to insufficient data on the composition of the cargo arriving from Dunkirk. An improperly marked unloading area, which, due to the lack of adequate infrastructure, forced the use of Levant manual ship cranes, rather than port cranes located about 300 m further from the pier (which were idle during the entire unloading time), which further complicated the whole process. Further, it became necessary to push the train stock, especially the ammunition wagons (for safety reasons) as a result of an improperly assembled train. Vehicles were not provided for the privates stationed at the naval barracks at Oksovye, or even one car for the commissioning commission, which is required to cooperate with remote customs units. To solve the problem, city buses and taxis were used, which significantly increased the cost of unloading. Among the written comments, it was also shown that the security service was not functioning properly, allowing too many outsiders into the unloading area or unnecessarily identifying the personnel involved in the process.
Finally, from the port, cars reach Warsaw by rail on July 19, and here the situation is more complicated. It is not known for sure whether the train passing through the capital ended up in the Main Armored Warehouse, and if so, were the tanks unloaded there? The author is inclined to the thesis that this did not happen, because the loading / unloading of new cars would take too much time, and the date of the train's arrival in Lutsk is known - the night of July 21-22. It can be assumed that the necessary records in the repository at st. Stalova 51 was liquidated for a short time, only the marked cars were excluded from the train, and then sent by rail to Lutsk, located about 400 km to the southeast. Only there could a proper administrative procedure take place, consisting in placing individual tanks on army records, assigning Polish registration numbers to them, presenting documents, etc. Even in the target garrison, the R35s functioned under their original, i.e. French numbers. , in summer. It should also be remembered that part of the battalion's vehicle fleet arrived along with the tanks, including Laffly 15VR off-road light wheeled vehicles.
