Active air defense of Warsaw in 1939

Active air defense of Warsaw in 1939. Warsaw, Vienna Railway Station area (corner of Marszałkowska Street and Jerusalem Alley). 7,92mm Browning wz. 30 on an anti-aircraft base.

During the defensive war of Poland, an important part of it was the battles for Warsaw, which were fought until September 27, 1939. Activities on land are described in detail. Much less known are the air defense battles of the active capital, especially anti-aircraft artillery.

Preparations for the air defense of the capital were undertaken in 1937. They were associated with the establishment by the President of the Republic of Poland in June 1936 of the State Air Defense Inspectorate headed by Major General V. Orlich-Drezer, and after his tragic death on July 17, 1936, brig. Dr. Jozef Zajonc. The latter began to work in August 1936 on the organization of the air defense of the state. In April 1937, with the help of a wide group of employees of the military apparatus, scientists and representatives of the state civil administration, the concept of state air defense was developed. Its consequence was the appointment in the country, among other things, of 17 centers of military and economic importance, which had to be protected from air strikes. In the departments of the districts of the corps, a system for monitoring the air territory was formed. Each of the centers was to be surrounded by two chains of visual posts, one of which was located 100 km from the center, and the other 60 km. Each post should be located in areas 10 km apart from each other - so that everything together forms a single system in the country. The positions had a mixed composition: it included policemen, non-commissioned officers and privates of the reserve who were not drafted into the army, postal workers, participants in military training, volunteers (scouts, members of the Union of Air and Gas Defense), as well as women. They are equipped with: telephone, binoculars and compass. 800 such points were organized in the country, and their phones were connected to the regional observation post (center). By September 1939, in the building of the Polish Post on the street. Poznanskaya in Warsaw. The largest network of posts spread around Warsaw - 17 platoons and 12 posts.

A device was installed in the telephone sets at the posts, which made it possible to automatically communicate with the center, turning off all conversations on the line between the post and the observation tank. On each tank were commanders with crews of non-commissioned officers and ordinary signalmen. The tank was intended to receive reports from observation posts, warning of places at risk of tarnishing, and the main observation tank. The last link was a key control element of the country's air defense commander and an integral part of his headquarters. The whole structure in terms of density was very poor compared to other Western countries. An additional disadvantage was that she used telephone exchanges and the country's telephone network, which were very easy to break during the fighting - and this happened quickly.

Work to strengthen the country's air defense system intensified in 1938 and especially in 1939. The threat of a German attack on Poland was becoming real. In the year of the war, only 4 million zlotys were allocated for the development of the surveillance network. Key state-owned industrial enterprises were ordered to purchase at their own expense a platoon of 40-mm wz. 38 Bofors (expenses PLN 350). The factories were to be staffed by workers, and their training was provided by the military. The workers of the plant and the reserve officers assigned to them were very ill-prepared for the maintenance of modern guns and the fight against enemy aircraft on hasty and shortened debugging courses.

In March 1939, Brigadier General Dr. Józef Zajonc. In the same month, measures were taken to further improve the technical condition of the surveillance service. Air Defense Command of the city of M. Troops. demanded from the commanders of the corps districts requests for the preparation of new automatic telephone exchanges and telephone sets, an increase in the number of direct telephone lines, etc. 1 car) with 13 observation platoons, 75 telephone brigades and 353 radio groups (regular positions: 14 N9S radio stations and 19 RKD radio stations) .

In the period from March 22 to March 25, 1939, pilots of the III / 1st Fighter Squadron participated in exercises to defend the capital's fence. Due to this, gaps appeared in the system for monitoring the defense of the city. Even worse, it turned out that the PZL-11 fighter was too slow when they wanted to intercept the fast PZL-37 Łoś bombers. In terms of speed, it was suitable for fighting the Fokker F. VII, Lublin R-XIII and PZL-23 Karaś. The exercises were repeated in subsequent months. Most of the enemy planes flew at speeds similar to or faster than the PZL-37 Łoś.

Warsaw was not included in the plans of the command for combat operations on the ground in 1939. In view of its key importance for the country - as the main center of state power, a major industrial center and an important communications center - it had to prepare to fight enemy aircraft. The Warsaw railway junction with two railway and two road bridges across the Vistula acquired strategic importance. Thanks to constant communications, it was possible to quickly transfer troops from eastern Poland to the west, deliver supplies or move troops.

The capital was the largest city in terms of population and area in the country. Until September 1, 1939, 1,307 million 380 million people lived in it, including about 22 thousand. Jews. The city was vast: as of September 1938, 14, it stretched over 148 hectares (141 km²), of which the left bank part was 9179 hectares (17 063 buildings), and the right bank - 4293 ​​8435 hectares (676 63 buildings), and the Vistula - about 50 ha. The perimeter of the city limits was 14 km. Of the total area, excluding the Vistula, about 5% of the area was built up; on cobbled streets and squares, in parks, squares and cemeteries - 1%; for railway areas - 30% and for water areas - XNUMX%. The rest, i.e. about XNUMX%, was occupied by an undeveloped area with unpaved areas, streets and private gardens.

Preparing for the Defense

Before the start of the war, the principles of air defense of the capital were developed. By order of the air defense commander of the Warsaw Center, a group of active defense, passive defense and a reconnaissance tank with a signaling center were subject to control. The first part included: fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft machine guns, barrier balloons, anti-aircraft searchlights. On the other hand, passive defense was organized on a per-citizen basis under the leadership of the state and local administration, as well as fire brigades, police, and hospitals.

Returning to the active defense of the barrier, the aviation included a Pursuit Brigade specially formed for this task. His headquarters was formed by mobilization order on the morning of August 24, 1939. In the spring of 1937, the idea was born to create a special hunting group for the defense of the capital, which was later called the Pursuit Brigade. It was then that the Chief Inspector of the Armed Forces ordered the creation of a PTS Group for the Control Aviation of the Supreme High Command with the task of defending the capital. Then it was assumed that it would come from the east. The group was assigned two Warsaw fighter squadrons of the 1st air regiment - III / 1 and IV / 1. In case of war, both squadrons (dions) were to operate from field airfields close to the city. Two locations were chosen: in Zielonka, at that time the city was 10 km east of the capital, and in the farm of Obora, 15 km south of the city. The last place was changed to Pomiechowek, and today it is the territory of the Wieliszew commune.

After the announcement of emergency mobilization on August 24, 1939, the headquarters of the brigade was created, consisting of: commander - lieutenant colonel. Stefan Pawlikovsky (commander of the 1st air regiment), deputy lieutenant colonel. Leopold Pamula, Chief of Staff - Major Dipl. drank. Eugeniusz Wyrwicki, tactical officer - captain. dipl. drank. Stefan Lashkevich, officer for special assignments - captain. drank. Stefan Kolodynski, technical officer, 1st lieutenant. tech. Franciszek Centar, supply officer Capt. drank. Tadeusz Grzymilas, commandant of the headquarters - cap. drank. Julian Plodovsky, adjutant - lieutenant floor. Zbigniew Kustrzynski. The 5th anti-aircraft radio intelligence company under the command of Captain V. General Tadeusz Legeżyński (1 N3 / S and 1 N2L / L radio stations) and the airport air defense company (8 platoons) - 650 Hotchkiss-type heavy machine guns (commander Lieutenant Anthony Yazvetsky). After mobilization, the brigade consisted of about 65 soldiers, including 54 officers. It consisted of 3 fighters, 8 RWD-1 aircraft (communication platoon No. 83) and 24 pilots. Both squadrons issued duty keys for two aircraft, which have been on duty in the hangars in Okents since August 1. The soldiers' passes were taken away and they were forbidden to leave the airport. The pilots were fully equipped: leather suits, fur boots and gloves, as well as maps of the environs of Warsaw on a scale of 300: 000 29. Four squadrons flew from Okentse to field airfields on August 18 at 00 hours.

The brigade had two squadrons of the 1st air regiment: III / 1, which was located in Zielonka near Warsaw (commander, captain Zdzislaw Krasnodenbsky: 111th and 112th fighter squadrons) and IV / 1, which went to Poniatow near Jablonna (commander captain Pilot Adam Kowalczyk: 113th and 114th EM). As for the airport in Poniatów, it was in the possession of Count Zdzisław Groholski, in a place identified by the inhabitants as Pyzhovy Kesh.

Four squadrons had 44 serviceable PZL-11a and C fighters. III/1 Squadron had 21 and IV/1 Dyon had 23. Some had airborne radios. In some, apart from two synchronous 7,92 mm wz. 33 PVUs with 500 rounds of ammunition per rifle were located for two extra kilometers in wings of 300 rounds each.

Until 1 September around 6:10 123. EM from III/2 Dyon from 10 PZL P.7a landed in Poniatów. To reinforce the brigade, the pilots of the 2nd Aviation Regiment from Krakow were ordered to fly to Okentse in Warsaw on August 31. Then, in the early morning of September 1, they flew to Poniatow.

The brigade did not include units important for its work in wartime: an airfield company, a transport column and a mobile aviation fleet. This greatly weakened the maintenance of its combat capability, including the repair of equipment in the field and maneuverability.

According to the plans, the persecution brigade was placed under the command of Colonel V. Art. Kazimierz Baran (1890-1974). After negotiations, Colonel Pawlikovsky with the air defense commander of the Warsaw Center and the Headquarters of the Air Force Commander-in-Chief, it was agreed that the brigade would operate independently in the area outside the shelling zone of the Warsaw Center. .

The Air Defense of Warsaw included the command of the Warsaw Air Defense Center, headed by Colonel Kazimierz Baran (commander of the anti-aircraft artillery group in peacetime, commander of the 1st anti-aircraft artillery regiment of Marshal Eduard Rydz-Smigly in Warsaw in 1936-1939); Deputy Commander of the Air Defense Forces for Active Air Defense - Lieutenant Colonel Franciszek Joras; Chief of Staff Major Dipl. Anthony Mordasevich; adjutant - captain. Jakub Chmielewski; liaison officer - capt. Konstantin Adamsky; materials officer - Captain Jan Dzyalak and employees, communications team, drivers, couriers - about 50 privates in total.

The mobilization of air defense units was announced on the night of August 23-24, 1939. Website of the air defense headquarters. In Warsaw, there was a bunker in the Handlowy bank on the street. Mazowiecka 16 in Warsaw. He began work at the end of August 1939 and worked there until 25 September. Then, until the surrender, he was in the bunker of the Warsaw Defense Command on the street. Marshalkovskaya in the building of the OPM.

On August 31, 1939, an emergency order was issued for anti-aircraft artillery. Therefore, the anti-aircraft artillery units of the country's air defense were deployed at the positions of key industrial, communications, military and administrative facilities. The largest number of units was concentrated in the capital. The remaining forces were allocated to large industrial enterprises and air bases.

Four 75-mm anti-aircraft guns were sent to Warsaw (factory: 11, 101, 102, 103), five separate semi-permanent 75-mm artillery batteries (factory: 101, 102, 103, 156., 157.), 1 75 mm anti-aircraft artillery tractor battery. To this were added 13 two-gun semi-stationary anti-aircraft artillery platoons - platoons: 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110.), three “factory” platoons (Zakłady PZL No. 1, PZL No. 2 are displayed and Polskie Zakłady Optical) and an additional "aviation" plan No. 181. The latter did not obey the colonel. Baran and covered the air base No. 1 of the Okentse airport. As for Airbase No. 1 at Okęcie, in addition to two Bofors, it was defended by 12 Hotchkiss heavy machine guns and probably several 13,2 mm wz. 30 Hotchkisses (perhaps five?).

As for anti-aircraft batteries, the largest part of the forces was in Warsaw: 10 semi-permanent batteries wz. 97 and wz. 97/25 (40 75 mm guns), 1 trailed battery (2 75 mm guns wz. 97/17), 1 motor day (3 motor batteries - 12 75 mm guns wz. 36St), 5 semi-permanent batteries (20 75 mm wz.37St guns). A total of 19 batteries of 75-mm guns of various designs, a total of 74 guns. The capital was defended by most of the latest 75mm wz. 36St and wz. 37St from Starachowice - 32 out of 44 produced. Not all batteries with modern 75-mm guns received central devices, which severely limited their combat capability. Before the war, only eight of these cameras were delivered. In the case of this device, it was A wz. 36 PZO-Lev system, which had three main parts:

a) Stereoscopic rangefinder with a base of 3 m (later with a base of 4 m and a magnification of 24 times), altimeter and speedometer. Thanks to them, the range to the observed target was measured, as well as the altitude, speed and direction of flight relative to the position of the battery of anti-aircraft guns.

b) A calculator that converted the data from the rangefinder unit (taking into account the amendments made by the battery commander) into the firing parameters for each gun of the battery, i.e. horizontal angle (azimuth), elevation angle of the gun barrel and the distance at which the fuse must be installed for the projectile being fired - the so-called. detachment.

c) Electrical system under DC voltage (4 V). He transmitted to three receivers installed on each of the guns the firing parameters developed by the conversion unit.

The entire central apparatus was hidden in six special boxes during transportation. A well-trained team had 30 minutes to develop it, i.e. transition from traveling to combat position.

The device was controlled by 15 soldiers, five of whom were in the rangefinder team, five more in the calculation team, and the last five controlled the receivers mounted on the guns. The task of the attendants at the receivers was to verify the tilt indicators without taking readings and measurements. The timing of the indicators meant that the gun was well prepared to fire. The device worked properly when the observed target was at a distance of 2000 m to 11000 m, at an altitude of 800 m to 8000 m and moved at a speed of 15 to 110 m/s, and the flight time of the projectile was no more than 35 seconds Even better shooting results , seven types of corrections could be made to the calculator. They allowed, among other things, to take into account: the effect of wind on the flight path of the projectile, the movement of the target during loading and flight, the distance between the central apparatus and the position of the artillery battery, the so-called. parallax.

The first camera of this series was entirely manufactured by the French company Optique et Precision de Levallois. Then the second, third and fourth copies were made partly at Optique et Precision de Levallois (rangefinder and all parts of the calculator) and partly at the Polish Optical Factory SA (assembly of the central apparatus and production of all gun receivers). In the rest of the Optique et Precision de Levallois cameras, only rangefinders and aluminum castings of the computing unit cases came from France. Work to improve the central apparatus continued all the time. The first copy of the new model with a rangefinder with a base of 5 m was planned to be delivered to Polskie Zakłady Optyczne SA by March 1, 1940.

In addition to the 75 mm battery, there were 14 semi-permanent platoons with 40 mm wz. 38 "Bofors": 10 military, three "factory" and one "air", a total of 28 40-mm guns. Colonel Baran immediately sent five platoons to protect facilities outside the capital:

a) on Palmyra - ammunition depots, a branch of the Main Armament Depot No. 1 - 4 guns;

b) in Rembertov - gunpowder factory

– 2 works;

c) to Łowicz - around the city and train stations

– 2 works;

d) to Gura Kalwaria - around the bridge over the Vistula - 2 works.

Nine platoons remained in the capital, including three "factory" and one "air".

In the case of the 10 platoons mobilized in the 1st Regiment, they were formed in the barracks in Bernerow on 27-29 August. Improvised units were formed from the remnants of mobilization, mainly from privates and reserve officers. Young, professional officers were seconded to batteries of infantry divisions (type A - 4 guns) or cavalry brigades (type B - 2 guns). The level of training of the reservists was clearly lower than that of the professional staff, and the reserve officers did not know Warsaw and the surrounding area. All platoons were withdrawn to firing positions.

until 30 August.

In the Air Defense Directorate of the Warsaw Center there were 6 officers, 50 privates, in the air defense batteries 103 officers and 2950 privates, in total 109 officers and 3000 privates. For the active defense of the sky over Warsaw on September 1, 1939, 74 guns of 75 mm caliber and 18 guns of 40 mm caliber wz. 38 Bofors, a total of 92 guns. At the same time, two of the five planned anti-aircraft rifle companies of type "B" could be used for combat (4 platoons of 4 machine guns, a total of 32 heavy machine guns, 10 officers and 380 privates, without vehicles); the remaining three companies of type A (with horse-drawn carriages) were sent by the commander of aviation and air defense to cover other centers. In addition, there were three companies of anti-aircraft searchlights: the 11th, 14th, 17th companies, consisting of 21 officers and 850 privates. A total of 10 platoons with 36 Maison Bréguet and Sautter-Harlé lights, as well as five barrage balloon companies of approximately 10 officers, 400 enlisted men and 50 balloons.

By August 31, 75 mm anti-aircraft artillery was deployed in four groups:

1. “Vostok” - 103rd semi-permanent artillery squadron of the section (commander Major Mieczysław Zilber; 4 guns wz. 97 and 12 guns of 75 mm wz. 97/25 caliber) and the 103rd semi-permanent artillery battery of the Divisional type I (see Kędzierski – 4 37 mm guns wz.75St.

2. "North": 101st semi-permanent artillery squadron Plot (commander Major Michal Khrol-Frolovich, squadron batteries and commander: 104. - Lieutenant Leon Svyatopelk-Mirsky, 105 - Captain Cheslav Maria Geraltovsky, 106. - Captain. Anthony Czolovsky) — 12 wz. 97/25 caliber 75 mm); 101. Semi-permanent artillery battery Section type I (commander Lieutenant Vincenty Dombrovsky; 4 guns wz. 37St, caliber 75 mm).

3. “South” - 102nd semi-permanent artillery squadron Plot (commander Major Roman Nemchinsky, battery commanders: 107th - reserve lieutenant Edmund Scholz, 108th - lieutenant Vaclav Kaminsky, 109th - lieutenant Jerzy Mazurkiewicz; 12 guns wz . .97/25 caliber 75 mm), 102. Semi-permanent artillery battery District type I (commander lieutenant Vladislav Shpiganovich; 4 guns wz. 37St, caliber 75 mm).

4. "Medium" - the 11th motorized anti-aircraft artillery squadron, reinforced by the 156th and 157th type I semi-permanent artillery batteries (each with 4 37-mm guns wz. 75St).

In addition, the 1st District Artillery and Tractor Battery was sent to Sekerki (commander - Lieutenant Zygmunt Adessman; 2 cannons 75 mm wz. 97/17), and a semi-permanent "air" platoon defended the Okentse airfield Okentse - observatory captain Miroslav Prodan, platoon commander of air base No. 1, pilot-lieutenant Alfred Belina-Grodsky - 2 40-mm guns

wz. 38 Bofors).

Most of the 75 mm medium caliber artillery (10 batteries) had equipment from the First World War. Neither the range nor the measuring equipment could reach or record the speed of the German aircraft, which were flying much higher and faster. Measuring devices in batteries with old French guns could successfully fire at aircraft flying at speeds up to 200 km / h.

Semi-permanent anti-aircraft artillery platoons each armed with 2 cannons of 40 mm wz. 38 "Bofors" were placed in important parts of the city: bridges, factories and the airport. Number of platoons: 105th (lieutenant / lieutenant / Stanislav Dmukhovsky), 106th (resident lieutenant Witold M. Pyasetsky), 107th (captain Zygmunt Jezersky), 108th (cadet commander Nikolai Dunin-Martsinkevich), 109- th (Res. Junior Lieutenant Viktor S. Pyasecki) and “factory” Polish Mortgages of Optics (commander NN), two “factory” platoons: PZL “Motniki” (mobilized by Polish Plants of Lotnichny Conclusions Motnikov Nr 1 in Warsaw, commander - retired captain Jakub Jan Hruby) and PZL “Płatowce” (mobilized Polskie Zakłady Lotnicze Wytwórnia Płatowców No. 1 in Warsaw, commander - N.N.).

In the case of Bofors, wz. 36, and semi-permanent combat, "factory" and "air" platoons received wz. 38. The main difference was that the former had a double axle, while the latter had a single axle. The wheels of the latter, after the transfer of the gun from traveling to combat, were disconnected and it stood on a three-keel base. Semi-solid platoons did not have their own motor traction, but their guns could be hitched to a tug and moved to another point.

Moreover, not all Bofors guns had K.3 rangefinders with a base of 1,5 m (they measured the distance to the target). Before the war, about 140 rangefinders were purchased in France and produced under license for PZO at 9000 zlotys apiece for about 500 anti-aircraft guns. None of them received a speedometer, which they “did not have time” to buy before the war for 5000 zlotys, for one of the reasons for the long selection procedure that lasted from spring 1937 to April 1939. In turn, the speedometer, which measured the speed and course of the aircraft, allowed the Bofors to conduct accurate fire.

The lack of specialized equipment greatly reduced the effectiveness of the guns. Shooting at so-called eye hunting, which promoted the “decisive factors” in anti-aircraft artillery in peacetime, was great for firing duck pellets, and not at an enemy aircraft moving at a speed of about 100 m / s at a distance of up to 4 km - a field of effective Bofors defeat. Not all modern anti-aircraft guns have at least some real measuring equipment.

Pursuit brigade in the battles for Warsaw

Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, early in the morning at 4:45 am. The main goal of the Luftwaffe was to fly in support of the Wehrmacht and destroy the Polish military aviation and the conquest of air supremacy associated with this. One of aviation's priorities in the early days was airports and air bases.

Information about the beginning of the war reached the headquarters of the persecution brigade at 5 o'clock in the morning thanks to a report from the state police station in Suwałki. A combat alert has been declared. Soon the Warsaw radio announced the beginning of the war. Surveillance network observers reported the presence of foreign aircraft flying in different directions at high altitudes. The police station from Mława sent news about planes flying to Warsaw. The commander gave the order for the immediate launch of two dions. In the morning, around 00:7, 50 PZL-21s from III/11 from 1 PZL-22 and 11 PZL-3s from IV/7 Dyon took off.

Enemy planes flew over the capital from the north. The Poles estimated their number at about 80 Heinkel He 111 and Dornier Do 17 bombers and 20 Messerschmitt Me 110 fighters. In the area between Warsaw, Jablona, ​​Zegrze and Radzymin, about 8 air battles were fought at an altitude of 00-2000 m: 3000 in the morning, much less formation of three bomber squadrons - 35 He 111 from II (K) / LG 1 in cover of 24 Me 110 from I (Z) / LG 1. The bomber squadrons started at 7:25 in the 5th minute intervals. There were several air battles in different places. The Poles managed to intercept several formations that returned from the attack. Polish pilots reported 6 downed aircraft, but their victories were exaggerated. In fact, they managed to knock out and most likely destroy the He 111 z 5. (K) / LG 1, which was bombing on Okentse. His crew made an emergency "belly" near the village of Meshki-Kuligi. During landing, the plane broke down (three crew members survived, one wounded died). This was the first victory in the defense of the capital. The pilots from IV/1 Dyon are fighting for him as a team. In addition, a second He 111 from the same squadron landed on its stomach with a stalled engine at its own airfield in Pounden. Due to heavy damage decommissioned from the state. In addition, He 111s from 6.(K)/LG 1, which attacked Skierniewice and the railway bridge near Piaseczno, collided with Polish fighters. One of the bombers (code L1 + CP) was badly damaged. He may have fallen victim to the 50th lieutenant. Witold Lokuchevsky. He made an emergency landing at Shippenbeil with 114% damage and a crew member who died from his wounds. In addition to these losses, two more bombers suffered minor damage. The bomber crews and escort managed to shoot down the 114th lieutenant. Stanisław Shmeila of the 110th EM, who crash-landed near Wyszków and crashed his car. The second casualty was Senior Lieutenant Bolesław Olevinsky of the 1st EM, who parachuted near Zegrze (shot down by Me 1 of 111. (Z)/LG 11) and 110th Lieutenant. Jerzy Palusinski from the 1st EM, whose PZL-25a was forced to land near the village of Nadymna. Palusinski attacked and damaged Me XNUMX May earlier. Grabmann with I(Z)/LG XNUMX (had XNUMX% damage).

Despite the loyalty of the Poles to the German crews operating the squadrons and keys, they managed to pass the city without problems between 7:25 and 10:40. According to Polish reports, the bombs fell on: Kertselego Square, Grochow, Sadyba Ofitserska (9 bombs), Powazki - sanitary battalion, Golendzinov. They were killed and wounded. In addition, German planes dropped 5-6 bombs on Grodzisk Mazowiecki, and 30 bombs fell on Blonie. Several houses were destroyed.

Around noon, a patrol of four PZL-11s from 112.EM caught up with a reconnaissance Dornier Do 17P 4.(F)/121 over Wilanów. Pilot Stefan Oksheja fired at him at close range, there was an explosion, and the entire enemy crew was killed.

In the afternoon, a large group of aircraft appeared over the capital. The Germans sent a formation of more than 230 vehicles to attack military targets. He 111Hs and Ps were dispatched from KG 27 and from II(K)/LG 1 with dive Junkers Ju 87Bs from I/StG 1 in cover of about 30 Messerschmitt Me 109Ds from I/JG 21 (three squadrons) and Me 110s from I( Z)/LG 1 and I/ZG 1 (22 Me 110B and C). The armada had 123 He 111s, 30 Ju 87s and 80-90 fighters.

Due to damage in the morning battle, 30 Polish fighters were lifted into the air, and the 152nd destroyer flew into battle. Her 6 PZL-11a and C also entered the battle. As in the morning, the Polish pilots could not stop the Germans, who dropped bombs on their targets. There was a series of battles and the Polish pilots suffered heavy losses after bomb escort attacks.

On the first day of the war, the pilots of the pursuit brigade flew at least 80 sorties and claimed 14 confident victories. In fact, they managed to destroy from four to seven enemy aircraft and damage several more. They suffered heavy losses - they lost 13 fighters, and a dozen more were damaged. One pilot was killed, eight were injured, one of them later died. In addition, another PZL-11c lost 152 units. EM and junior lieutenant. Anatoly Piotrovsky died near Khoszczówka. On the evening of September 1, only 24 fighters were ready for battle, only by the evening of the next day the number of serviceable fighters increased to 40; there was no fighting all day. On the first day, the Warsaw anti-aircraft artillery had no success.

According to the operational summary of the security department of the High Command of the Ministry of Military Affairs. On September 1, at 17:30, bombs fell on Babice, Wawrzyszew, Sekerki (incendiary bombs), Grochow and Okecie near the Warsaw Center, as well as on the hull factory - one dead and several wounded.

However, according to the "Information of the Commander of the Air Defense Forces on the Consequences of the German Bombardments on September 1 and 2, 1939" dated September 3, Warsaw was attacked three times on the first day of the war: at 7:00, 9:20 and 17:30. High-explosive bombs (500, 250 and 50 kg) were dropped on the city. About 30% of unexploded explosions were dropped, 5 kg of thermite-incendiary bombs were dropped. They attacked from a height of more than 3000 m, in disarray. In the city center from the side of Prague, the Kerbedsky bridge was blown up. Important objects were bombed three times - with 500- and 250-kilogram bombs - PZL Okęcie (1 killed, 5 wounded) and suburbs: Babice, Vavshiszew, Sekerki, Czerniakow and Grochow - with incendiary bombs that caused small fires. As a result of the shelling, there were insignificant material and human losses: 19 killed, 68 wounded, including 75% of civilians. In addition, the following cities were attacked: Wilanow, Wlochy, Pruszkow, Wulka, Brwinow, Grodzisk-Mazowiecki, Blonie, Jaktorov, Radzymin, Otwock, Rembertov and others. They were mostly killed and wounded, and material losses were insignificant.

In the days that followed, enemy bombers reappeared. There were new fights. The fighters of the pursuit brigade could do little. Losses mounted on both sides, but on the Polish side they were larger and heavier. In the field, damaged equipment could not be repaired, and aircraft that made an emergency landing in an emergency could not be pulled back and returned to service.

On September 6, many successes and defeats were recorded. In the morning, after 5:00, 29 Ju 87 dive bombers from IV(St)/LG 1, escorted by Me 110 from I/ZG 1, attacked the marshalling yard in Warsaw and flew to the capital from the west. Over Wlochy (a city near Warsaw), these aircraft were intercepted by fighters from the pursuit brigade. Aviators from IV/1 Dyon engaged the Me 110. They managed to destroy the Maj aircraft. Hammes, who died, and his gunner Ofw. Steffen was captured. The lightly wounded shooter was taken to Dion Airport III/1 in Zaborov. The German car landed on its stomach near the village of Voytseshyn. The Poles suffered no losses in battle.

Around noon, 25 Ju 87s from IV(St)/LG 1 (combat raid 11:40-13:50) and 20 Ju 87s from I/StG 1 (combat raid 11:45-13:06) appeared over Warsaw. . . . The first formation attacked the bridge in the northern part of the capital, and the second - the railway bridge in the southern part of the city (probably the Srednikovy Bridge (?). About a dozen PZL-11s and several PZL-7as led by Captain Kowalczyk flew into battle. The Poles failed to capture a single in one formation, the Germans from I/StG 1 reported the sighting of individual fighters, but there was no combat.

While flying IV/1 Dyon to the field airfield at Radzikovo on September 6 or around noon of the same day, the headquarters of the pursuit brigade was ordered to conduct a sweep in the Kolo-Konin-Lovich triangle. This happened as a result of a morning agreement between the command of the Air Force "Poznan" and the aviation command. Colonel Pavlikovsky sent soldiers of the 18th brigade to this area (flight time 14:30-16:00). This cleansing was supposed to give a "breath" to the troops of the "Poznan" army, retreating towards Kutno. In total, there are 11 PZL-1s from IV / 15 Dyon from the airfield in Radzikov under the command of Captain V. Kovalchik and 3 PZL-11s from III / 1 Dyon from the airfield in Zaborov, which was located a few kilometers from Radzikov. These forces were to consist of two formations flying close to each other (12 and six PZL-11). Thanks to this, it became possible to call colleagues for help by radio. Their flight distance was about 200 km one way. German troops were already in the clearing zone. In the event of a forced landing, the pilot could be captured. In the event of a lack of fuel or damage, the pilots could make an emergency landing at the field airfield in Osek Maly (8 km north of Kolo), where the headquarters of Poznan III / 15 Dön Myslivsky with help had to wait for them until 00:3. The pilots carried out a sweep in the Kutno-Kolo-Konin area. Having flown 160-170 km, about 15:10 to the southwest. from Kolo they managed to detect enemy bombers. The pilots went out almost head-on. They were taken by surprise by 9 He 111Hs from 4./KG 26 operating in the Lenchica-Lovich-Zelko triangle (combat raid 13:58-16:28). The attack of the pilots focused on the last key. From 15:10 to 15:30 there was an air battle. The Poles attacked the Germans with their entire formation, attacking the whole team at close range. The defensive fire of the Germans proved to be very effective. Deck Gunners 4. Staffel reported at least four murders, of which only one was later confirmed.

According to the report of Kowalczyk, his pilots reported the fall of 6 planes within 7-10 minutes, 4 were damaged. Three of their shots landed in the Kolo Uniejów combat area, and another four landed on the return flight between Lenchica and Blonie due to lack of fuel. Then one of them returned to the unit. In total, 4 PZL-6s and two dead pilots were lost during the cleanup: 11th Lieutenant V. Roman Stog - fell (crashed into the ground near the village of Strashkow) and a platoon. Mieczysław Kazimierczak (killed after parachute jump from a fire from the ground; probably his own fire).

The Poles really managed to shoot down and destroy three bombers. One landed on its belly near the village of Rushkow. Another one was in the fields of the village of Labendy, and the third one exploded in the air and fell near Unieyuv. The fourth was damaged, but managed to break away from his pursuers and was forced to land on his stomach at Breslau Airport (now Wroclaw). On the way back, the pilots attacked a random formation of three He 111Hs from Stab/KG 1 near Łowicz - to no avail. There was not enough fuel and ammunition. One pilot had to make an emergency landing immediately before the attack due to lack of fuel, and the Germans counted him as "shot down".

On the afternoon of September 6, the Pursuit Brigade received an order to fly the Dion to airfields in the Lublin region. The detachment suffered very heavy losses in six days, it had to be supplemented and reorganized. The next day, the fighter jets flew to airports inland. The commanders of the 4th Panzer Division were approaching Warsaw. On September 8-9, fierce battles were fought with her on the improvised ramparts of Okhota and Volya. The Germans did not have time to take the city on the move and were forced to retreat to the fore. The siege has begun.

Air Defense Warsaw

Air defense troops from the Warsaw Center took part in the battles with the Luftwaffe over Warsaw until September 6th. In the early days, the fence was opened several times. Their efforts were ineffective. The gunners failed to destroy a single aircraft, although several kills were reported, for example over Okentse on 3 September. Brigadier General M. Troyanovsky, Commander of the District of Corps I, was appointed General of Brig. Valerian Plague, September 4th. He was ordered to defend the capital from the west and organize the close defense of the bridges on both sides of the Vistula in Warsaw.

The approach of the Germans to Warsaw caused a large and panicked evacuation of the headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the highest bodies of state power (September 6-8), incl. State Commissariat of the Capital City of Warsaw. The Commander-in-Chief left Warsaw on September 7 for Brest-on-Bug. On the same day, the President of the Republic of Poland and the government flew to Lutsk. This swift flight of the country's leadership hit hard on the morale of the defenders and residents of Warsaw. The world has fallen on the head of many. The supreme power took “everything” with it, incl. a number of police departments and many fire brigades for their own protection. Others spoke of their "evacuation", including that "they took their wives and luggage with them in cars and left."

After escaping from the capital of state authorities, Stefan Starzynski, the city's commissar, took up the post of civil commissar in the Warsaw Defense Command on 8 September. Local self-government, headed by the president, refused to "evacuate" the government to the east and became the head of the civil authority for the defense of the city. On September 8-16, by order of the Commander-in-Chief in Warsaw, the Warsaw Army Group was formed, and then the Warsaw Army. Its commander was Major General V. Julius Rommel. On September 20, the army commander established an advisory body - the Civil Committee - to represent political, social and economic interests. It brought together representatives of the main political and social groups of the city. They were to be led personally by General J. Rommel or instead of him by a civilian commissar under the commander of the army.

One of the consequences of the evacuation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from the capital was a very serious weakening of the Warsaw Air Defense Forces until September 6th. On September 4, two platoons (4 40-mm guns) were transferred to Skierniewice. On September 5, two platoons (4 40-mm guns), the 101st daplot and one 75-mm modern battery were transferred to Lukow. One platoon (2 40 mm guns) was sent to Chełm, and the other (2 40 mm guns) to Krasnystaw. One modern battery of 75 mm caliber and one trailed battery of 75 mm caliber were transported to Lvov. The 11th daplot was sent to Lublin, and the 102nd daplot and one modern 75-mm battery were sent to Bzhest. All 75-mm anti-aircraft batteries that defended the main left bank of the city were withdrawn from the capital. The command explained these changes by the fact that the railway units of the three fighting armies from the west nevertheless approached the capital and filled in the gaps. As it turned out, it was just a dream of the High Command.

By September 16, only the 10th and 19th specific 40-mm type A motorized artillery batteries, as well as the 81st and 89th specific 40-mm type B artillery batteries had 10 Bofors wz. 36 caliber 40 mm. As a result of battles and retreats, part of the batteries had unfinished states. In the 10th and 19th there were four and three guns (standard: 4 guns), and in the 81st and 89th - one- and two-gun (standard: 2 guns). In addition, a section of 19 km and platoons from Lovich and Rembertov (4 Bofors guns) returned to the capital. For homeless children arriving from the front, a collection point was organized in the barracks of the 1st PAP Lot in Mokotov on the street. Rakovetskaya 2b.

On September 5, the group of air defense measures of the Warsaw Center became part of the group of the commander of the defense of Warsaw, General V. Chuma. In connection with the large reduction in equipment, Colonel Baran, on the evening of September 6, introduced a new organization of the center's groups and set new tasks.

On the morning of September 6, the Warsaw Air Defense Forces included: 5 anti-aircraft 75-mm batteries (20 75-mm guns), 12 40-mm anti-aircraft platoons (24 40-mm guns), 1 company of 150-cm anti-aircraft searchlights, 5 companies of anti-aircraft guns (including 2 B without horses) and 3 companies of barrage balloons. Total: 76 officers, 396 non-commissioned officers and 2112 privates. On September 6, Colonel Baran had 44 anti-aircraft guns (20 caliber 75 mm, including only four modern wz. 37St and 24 wz. 38 Bofors 40 mm caliber) and five companies of anti-aircraft guns. 75 mm batteries had an average of 3½ fire, 40 mm military platoons 4½ fire, 1½ fire in "factory" platoons, and anti-aircraft machine gun companies had 4 fire.

In the evening of the same day, Colonel Baran established a new division of groups and tasks for the defense of the Warsaw sector, as well as tactical relationships:

1. Group "Vostok" - commander Major Mechislav Zilber, commander of the 103rd daplot (75-mm semi-permanent batteries wz. 97 and wz. 97/25; batteries: 110, 115, 116 and 117 and 103. Anti-aircraft battery 75-mm sh. 37 St.). Task: high day and night defense of the Warsaw fence.

2. Group "Bridges" - commander cap. Zygmunt Jezersky; composition: platoons of the 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th, 108th, 109th and a platoon of the Borisev plant. Task: defense of the bridge fence and the center at medium and low altitudes, especially the defense of the bridges over the Vistula. 104th platoon (fire commander, reserve cadet Zdzisław Simonowicz), positions at the railway bridge in Prague. The platoon was destroyed by a bomber. 105th platoon (fire commander / junior lieutenant / Stanislav Dmukhovsky), positions between the Poniatowski bridge and the railway bridge. 106th platoon (commander of the resident lieutenant Witold Piasecki), firing position in Lazienki. 107th platoon (commander captain Zygmunt Jezersky). 108th platoon (cadet commander / junior lieutenant / Nikolai Dunin-Martsinkevich), firing position near the ZOO; platoon destroyed by the Luftwaffe. 109th platoon (commander lieutenant of the reserve Viktor Pyasetsky), firing positions at Fort Traugutt.

3. Group "Svidry" - commander captain. Yakub Hrubi; Composition: 40-mm PZL plant platoon and 110th 40-mm anti-aircraft platoon. Both platoons were assigned to defend the crossing in the Svider Male area.

4. Group “Powązki” – 5th company AA km Task: to cover the area of ​​the Gdańsk railway station and the Citadel.

5. Group "Dvorzhets" - company 4 section km. Objective: to cover the Filters and the Main Station area.

6. Group "Prague" - company 19 km section. Objective: to protect the Kerbed bridge, Vilnius railway station and East railway station.

7. Group "Lazenki" - section 18 km. Task: protection of the area of ​​the Srednikovy and Poniatovsky bridge, gas plant and pumping station.

8. Group "Medium" - 3rd company AA km. Task: cover the central part of the object (2 platoons), cover the Warsaw 2 radio station.

Transferred on September 6 at the disposal of Colonel V. Baran, he sent the 103rd 40-mm platoon to Chersk to protect the crossing. On September 9, there were two cases of unauthorized departure from a combat post without a good reason, i.e. desertion. Such a case occurred in the 117th battery, which left the fire departments in the Gotslav area, destroying the guns and leaving the measuring equipment. The second one was in the area of ​​Svidera Male, where the "Lovich" platoon left the firing position and moved to Otwock without permission, leaving part of the equipment in position. The commander of the 110th platoon appeared before a military tribunal. A similar case was initiated in the field court against Capt. The spark that could not be found. A similar situation occurred in the 18th company of the military air defense, when its commander, Lieutenant Cheslav Novakovsky, left for Otwock (September 15 at 7 am) for his family and did not return. Colonel Baran also referred the case to the field court. At the end of the first ten days of September, the Bofors platoons ran out of spare barrels for their guns, so they could not fire effectively. We managed to find a couple of hundred spare barrels hidden in warehouses and distributed among platoons.

During the siege of the city, the conspiratorial troops reported many successes. For example, on September 9, Colonel. Baran about shooting down 5 aircraft, and on September 10 - only 15 aircraft, of which 5 were within the city.

On September 12, there was another change of firing positions and means of communication of anti-aircraft artillery units of the Warsaw center. Even then, Colonel Baran reported on the need to strengthen the defense of the Warsaw border with 75-mm wz. 37th boat due to the lack of high-ceiling equipment and the appointment of a hunting dion to cover the city. Unsuccessfully. On that day, in situational report No. 3, Colonel Baran wrote: A raid made by a key of 3 Heinkel-111F aircraft at 13.50 was fought by 40-mm platoons and heavy machine guns. 2 aircraft were shot down while diving on bridges. They fell in the area of ​​St. Tamka and st. Medov.

On September 13, by 16:30, a report was received about the fall of 3 aircraft. The Germans attacked the Gdansk railway station area, the Citadel and the surrounding area with 50 aircraft. At this time, the positions of a separate 103rd anti-aircraft battery wz. 37 St. Lieutenant Kendzersky. 50 bomb craters formed nearby. The Germans did not have time to destroy a single gun. Even during the evacuation from the city, its commander received Captain V. A set of marine vehicles. Then he tore off a 40-mm gun left on the road near Bielany and attached it to his battery. The second 40-mm gun was received by the battery on the Mokotovsky field from the 10th 40-mm anti-aircraft battery stationed there. By order of Lieutenant Kendziersky, a factory platoon from Boryshevo with Bofors (commander of reserve lieutenant Erwin Labus) was also subordinated and took up firing positions at Fort Traugut. Then the 109th 40-mm anti-aircraft platoon, 103rd lieutenant. Viktor Pyasetsky. This commander set up his guns on the slope of Fort Traugutt, from where he had excellent visibility and worked very closely with the 75th battery. The 40mm guns pulled the German aircraft down from the higher ceiling and then opened fire on them with the 103mm guns. As a result of this interaction, the 9th battery reported 1 accurate knocks and a number of probable ones from September 27 to 109, and the 11th platoon had 9 accurate knocks to its credit. Thanks to the foresight of Lieutenant Kendziersky, after September 75, his battery took all the 36-mm anti-aircraft ammunition for the wz. XNUMXSt and until the end of the siege did not feel his shortcomings.

On September 14, at 15:55, the planes attacked Zoliborz, Wola and partially the city center. The main goal was defensive lines in the Zoliborz sector. As a result of the raid, 15 fires broke out in the area of ​​military and government facilities, including at the Gdansk railway station, and in the entire northern area of ​​the city (11 houses were demolished); partially damaged filters and a network of tram tracks. As a result of the raid, 17 soldiers were killed and 23 wounded.

On 15 September it was reported that it had been hit by one aircraft and was supposed to land in the Marek area. Around 10:30 am, their own PZL-11 fighter was fired upon by heavy machine guns and infantry. At that time, soldiers were forbidden to open fire until the officer carefully recognized the aircraft. On this day, the Germans surrounded the city, squeezing the siege ring from the east. In addition to aerial bombardment, the Germans used about 1000 heavy guns that fired heavily. It also became very troublesome for anti-aircraft gunners. Artillery shells exploded in their firing positions, resulting in casualties and casualties. For example, on September 17, as a result of artillery fire, by 17:00, 5 wounded privates, 1 damaged 40-mm gun, 3 vehicles, 1 heavy machine gun and 11 dead horses were reported. On the same day, the 115th machine gun company (two platoons of 4 heavy machine guns each) and the 5th balloon company, which were part of the air defense group, arrived in Warsaw from Svider Maly. During the day, strong aerial reconnaissance (8 raids) was observed in different directions, at different altitudes by bombers, reconnaissance aircraft and Messerschmitt fighters (single aircraft and keys, 2-3 vehicles each) from 2000 m for irregular flights and frequent changes in flight parameters; no effect.

On September 18, reconnaissance raids by single aircraft were repeated (they were counted 8), leaflets were also dropped. One of the first ("Dornier-17") was shot down at 7:45 in the morning. His crew had to make an emergency landing in the Babice area. In connection with the attack to capture the Pruszkow area, Colonel. dipl. Anti-aircraft battery Mariana Porwit, consisting of three platoons of two 40-mm guns. At dawn, the battery took up firing positions in the Kolo-Volya-Chiste sector.

The city was still under ground artillery fire. On September 18, she inflicted the following losses in AA units: 10 wounded, 14 horses killed, 2 boxes of 40-mm ammunition destroyed, 1 truck damaged and other small ones.

On September 20, at about 14:00, in the area of ​​​​the Central Institute of Physical Education and the Belyansky Forest, a Henschel-123 and Junkers-87 dive bombers raided. Another strong raid at 16:15 was made by about 30-40 aircraft of various types: Junkers-86, Junkers-87, Dornier-17, Heinkel-111, Messerschmitt-109 and Henschel-123. During the daytime attack, the elevator caught fire. The units reported downing 7 enemy aircraft.

On September 21, it was reported that 2 aircraft were shot down as a result of anti-aircraft fire. Almost all anti-aircraft artillery positions came under fire from ground artillery. There are new wounded

and material losses. On September 22, flights of single bombers for reconnaissance purposes were observed in the morning; leaflets were again scattered around the city. Between 14:00 and 15:00 there was an enemy raid on Prague, about 20 aircraft, one aircraft was shot down. Between 16:00 and 17:00 there was a second raid involving more than 20 aircraft. The main attack was on the Poniatowski Bridge. The second aircraft was reported to have been shot down. Two planes were shot down during the day.

On September 23, single bombing and reconnaissance flights were again recorded. During the day, no news of the bombardment of the city and its environs was received. Two Dornier 2s were reported to have been shot down. All parts came under heavy fire, which led to losses in artillery. There were more killed and wounded, killed and wounded horses, two 17-mm guns were badly damaged. One of the battery commanders was seriously wounded.

September 24 in the morning, from 6:00 to 9:00, flights of single bombers and reconnaissance aircraft were observed. Between 9:00 and 11:00 there were raids with waves from different directions. At the same time, more than 20 aircraft of various types were in the air. The morning raid inflicted heavy losses on the Royal Castle. Aircraft crews deftly avoided anti-aircraft fire, often changing flight conditions. The next raid took place around 15:00. During the morning raids, 3 aircraft were shot down, during the daytime - 1 was shot down and 1 was damaged. Filming was hindered by weather conditions - overcast. In the grouping of artillery units, Colonel Baran ordered a reorganization, strengthening the cover of the Filters and Pumping Stations. Artillery units were constantly under fire from ground artillery, the intensity of which increased during air raids. 2 officers were killed, including 1 battery commander and 1 machine gun platoon commander. In addition, they were killed and wounded during the operation of guns and machine guns. As a result of artillery fire, one 75-mm semi-solid gun was completely destroyed, and a number of serious losses in military equipment were recorded.

"Wet Monday" - 25 September.

The German command decided to launch a massive air raid and heavy artillery fire on the besieged city in order to break the resistance of the defenders and force them to surrender. The attacks continued from 8:00 to 18:00. At this time, Luftwaffe units from Fl.Fhr.zbV with a total strength of approximately 430 Ju 87, Hs 123, Do 17 and Ju 52 bombers made seven raids - 1176 sorties with additional units. German calculations dropped 558 tons of bombs, including 486 tons of high-explosive and 72 tons of incendiary ones. The attack involved 47 Junkers Ju 52 transports from IV/KG.zbV2, from which 102 small incendiary bombs were dropped. Bombers covered the Messerschmitts of I/JG 510 and I/ZG 76. The air strikes were accompanied by powerful heavy artillery support.

The city burned in hundreds of places. As a result of heavy smoke, which prevented the fight against anti-aircraft artillery raids, the commander of the "West" squad, Colonel Dipl. M. Porvit ordered to fight enemy aircraft with machine guns on all throws, except for the advanced positions. In the case of low-altitude attacks, small arms were to be led by designated groups of riflemen under the command of officers.

The air attack paralyzed work, including the city's power plant in Powisla; there was no electricity in the city from 15:00. A little earlier, on September 16, artillery fire caused a large fire in the engine room of the thermal power plant, which was extinguished with the help of the fire department. At that time, about 2000 people were hiding in his shelters, mostly residents of nearby houses. The second target of the strategic utility's vicious attacks were the city's water and sewer plants. As a result of the interruption in the supply of electricity from the power plant, hydraulic structures were disconnected. During the siege, about 600 artillery shells, 60 air bombs and XNUMX incendiary bombs fell on all station facilities of the city's water supply and sewerage facilities.

German artillery destroyed the city with high-explosive fire and shrapnel. Almost all places of command stops were fired upon; forward positions suffered less. The fight against enemy aircraft was difficult because of the smoke that covered the city, which was burning in many places. Around 10 am Warsaw was already burning in more than 300 places. On that tragic day, between 5 and 10 people could have died. Warsaw, and thousands more were injured.

It was reported that 13 aircraft were shot down in a day. In fact, during the terrorist air raid, the Germans lost one Ju 87 and two Ju 52s to Polish artillery fire (from which small incendiary bombs were dropped).

As a result of the bombing, the main city facilities were badly damaged - the Power Plant, Filters, and the Pumping Station. This disrupted the supply of electricity and water. The city was on fire, and there was nothing to put out the fire. Heavy artillery and bombardment on 25 September hastened the decision to surrender Warsaw. The next day, the Germans launched an assault, which was repulsed. However, on the same day, members of the Civic Committee asked General Rommel to surrender the city.

As a result of the huge losses suffered by the city, the commander of the "Warsaw" army, Major General S.J. Rommel, ordered a complete ceasefire for 24 hours from 12:00 on September 27. Its goal was to agree with the commander of the 8th German Army on the conditions for the return of Warsaw. Negotiations were to be completed by 29 September. The surrender agreement was concluded on 28 September. According to its provisions, the march of the Polish garrison was to take place on September 29 from 20 pm. Major General von Cohenhausen. Until the city was captured by the Germans, the city was to be governed by President Starzhinsky with the City Council and institutions subordinate to them.

Summation

Warsaw defended from 1 to 27 September. The city and its inhabitants were hit hard by a series of air raids and artillery strikes, the most devastating of which was on 25 September. The defenders of the capital, applying to their service a lot of strength and dedication, often great and heroic, deserving the highest respect, did not really interfere with enemy aircraft during the bombardment of the city.

During the years of defense, the capital had a population of 1,2-1,25 million people and became a place of refuge for about 110 thousand people. soldiers. 5031 97 officers, 425 15 non-commissioned officers and privates fell into German captivity. It is estimated that between 20 and 4 people died in the battles for the city. killed civilians and about 5-287 thousand fallen soldiers - incl. 3672 officers and 20 non-commissioned officers and privates are buried in the city cemetery. In addition, tens of thousands of residents (about 16 XNUMX) and military personnel (about XNUMX XNUMX) were injured.

According to the report of one of the underground workers who worked at the Headquarters of the Police in 1942, before September 1, there were 18 buildings in Warsaw, of which only 495 2645 (14,3%), buildings with damage (from light to severe) were not damaged during their defense time was 13 847 (74,86%) and 2007 buildings (10,85%) were completely destroyed.

The city center was badly damaged. The power plant in Powisla was damaged by a total of 16%. Almost all buildings and structures of the power plant were damaged to one degree or another. Its total losses are estimated at PLN 19,5 million. Similar losses were suffered by the city's water supply and sewerage. There were 586 damages on the water supply network, and 270 on the sewerage network, in addition, 247 drinking water pipes and a significant amount of house drains were damaged along a length of 624 m. The company lost 20 workers killed, 5 seriously wounded and 12 lightly wounded during the fighting.

In addition to material losses, national culture suffered huge losses, incl. On September 17, the Royal Castle and its collections burned down, set on fire by artillery fire. The material losses of the city were estimated after the war according to the calculations of prof. Marina Lalkiewicz, in the amount of 3 billion zł (for comparison, the revenues and expenditures of the state budget in the financial year 1938-39 amounted to 2,475 billion zlotys).

The Luftwaffe managed to fly over Warsaw and drop supplies without much "problem" from the first hours of the war. To a minimal extent, this could be prevented by the brigade's fighters, and even less so by anti-aircraft artillery. The only real difficulty that stood in the way of the Germans was bad weather.

During the six days of fighting (September 1-6), the pilots of the pursuit brigade reported 43 definitely destroyed and 9 probably destroyed and 20 damaged Luftwaffe aircraft during the defense of the capital. According to German data, the real successes of the Poles turned out to be much less. German aviation in battles with the pursuit brigade lost forever six days

17-20 combat aircraft (see table), a dozen more received less than 60% damage and were repairable. This is an excellent result, given the old equipment and weak weapons of the Poles with whom they fought.

Own losses were very high; The pursuit brigade was almost annihilated. From the initial state, 54 fighters were lost in battles (plus 3 additions PZL-11 to III / 1 Dyon), 34 fighters received irreparable damage and were left behind (almost 60%). Part of the aircraft damaged in battle could be saved if there were spare propellers, wheels, engine parts, etc., and there was a repair and evacuation base. In III / 1 Dönier, 13 PZL-11 fighters and one without the participation of the enemy were lost in battles with the Luftwaffe. In turn, IV / 1 Dyon lost 17 PZL-11 and PZL-7a fighters and three more without the participation of the enemy in battles with the Luftwaffe. The persecution team lost: four were killed and one was missing, and 10 were injured - hospitalized. On September 7, III/1 Dyon had 5 serviceable PZL-2s and 11 PZL-3s in Kerzh under repair at the airfield in Kerzh 11 and Zaborov. On the other hand, IV/1 Dyon had 6 PZL-11s and 4 PZL-7a operational at Belżyce airfield, with 3 more PZL-11s under repair.

Despite the grouping of large air defense forces in the capital (92 guns), anti-aircraft gunners in the first period of defense until September 6 did not destroy a single enemy aircraft. After the retreat of the pursuit brigade and the capture of 2/3 anti-aircraft artillery, the situation in Warsaw became even worse. The enemy surrounded the city. There were far fewer resources to deal with his aircraft, and most of the latest 75 mm anti-aircraft guns were sent back. About a dozen days later, four motorized batteries with 10 40 mm wz. 36 Bofors. These tools, however, could not fill all the gaps. On the day of surrender, the defenders had 12 75 mm anti-aircraft guns (including 4 wz. 37St) and 27 40 mm Bofors wz. 36 and wz. 38 (14 platoons) and eight machine gun companies with a small amount of ammunition. During enemy raids and shelling, the defenders destroyed two 75-mm anti-aircraft batteries and two 2-mm guns. Losses amounted to: two officers killed, about a dozen non-commissioned officers and privates killed, and several dozen wounded privates.

In the defense of Warsaw, according to the research of the gossip commander of the Warsaw Center, Colonel V. Aries, 103 enemy aircraft should have been shot down, of which six (sic!) were credited to the account of the Chase brigade, and 97 shot down by artillery and anti-aircraft guns. The commander of the Warsaw Army appointed three Virtuti Militari crosses and 25 Valor crosses for distribution to air defense units. The first were presented by Colonel Baran: Lieutenant Wieslav Kedziorsky (commander of the 75-mm St battery), Lieutenant Mikolay Dunin-Martsinkevich (commander of the 40-mm platoon) and Lieutenant Anthony Yazvetsky (section 18 km).

The success of the capital's ground-based anti-aircraft guns is greatly exaggerated, and fighters are clearly underestimated. Too often, their throws have reported hits for which there is no real evidence of an opponent's losses. Moreover, from the surviving daily reports of Colonel S. Oven about the successes cannot be derived from this number, the difference is still too great, which is not known how to explain.

Judging by the documents of the Germans, they irretrievably lost at least eight bombers, fighters and reconnaissance aircraft over Warsaw from anti-aircraft fire (see table). A few more vehicles from distant or close reconnaissance squadrons could be hit and destroyed. However, this cannot be a big loss (row 1-3 cars?). Another dozen aircraft received damage of various types (less than 60%). Compared to the declared 97 shots, we have a maximum 12-fold overestimation of air defense shots.

During the active anti-aircraft defense of Warsaw in 1939, fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery destroyed at least 25-28 combat aircraft, another dozen received less than 60% damage, i.e. were fit for repair. With all the recorded destroyed enemy aircraft - 106 or even 146-155 - little was achieved, and just as little. The great fighting spirit and dedication of many could not adequately bridge the large gap in the technique of equipping the defenders in relation to the technique of the enemy.

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