The rise of the German armored forces

The rise of the German armored forces. The strength of the German armored divisions on the eve of World War II lay not so much in the quality of equipment, but in the organization and training of officers and soldiers.

The genesis of the Panzerwaffe is still not a fully understood topic. Despite hundreds of books and thousands of articles written on this topic, there are still many questions that need to be clarified in the formation and development of the armored forces of Germany. This is due, among other things, to the name of the later Colonel General Heinz Guderian, whose role is often overestimated.

The restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, the peace treaty signed on June 28, 1919, which established a new order in Europe after the First World War, led to a sharp reduction in the German army. In accordance with Articles 159-213 of this treaty, Germany could only have a small defense force, not exceeding 100 15 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers (including no more than 000 6 in the navy), organized into seven infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions. and a rather modest fleet (6 old battleships, 12 light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 77 torpedo boats). It was forbidden to have military aircraft, tanks, artillery with a caliber of more than 12 mm, submarines and chemical weapons. In some areas of Germany (for example, in the Rhine Valley), fortifications were ordered to be demolished, and the construction of new ones was prohibited. General conscription military service was banned, soldiers and non-commissioned officers had to serve in the army for at least 25 years, and officers for at least XNUMX years. The German General Staff, considered the exceptionally combat-ready brain of the army, was also to be disbanded.

In 1925, the first German school was established in Wünsdorf near Berlin to conduct specialized courses for tank officers.

The new German state was created in an atmosphere of internal unrest and fighting in the east (with Soviet and Polish troops trying to achieve the most favorable territorial arrangement for themselves), from November 9, 1918, when Emperor Wilhelm II was forced to abdicate, to 6 February 1919 - so-called. Weimar Republic. A new republican legal basis for the functioning of the state, including a new constitution, was being developed in Weimar from December 1918 to early February 1919, when the provisional National Assembly was in session. On February 6, the German Republic was proclaimed in Weimar, retaining the name Deutsches Reich (German Reich, which can also be translated as the German Empire), although the newly organized state was unofficially called the Weimar Republic.

It is worth adding here that the name German Reich has its roots in the 962th century, during the time of the Holy Roman Empire (founded in 1032), which consisted of the theoretically equal kingdoms of Germany and the kingdom of Italy, including the territories not only of modern Germany and northern Italy, but also Switzerland, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands (since 1353). In 1648, the rebellious Franco-German-Italian population of the small central-western part of the Empire won independence, creating a new state - Switzerland. In 1806, the Kingdom of Italy became independent, and the remainder of the Empire now consisted mainly of scattered Germanic states, which at the time were ruled by the Habsburgs, the later dynasty that ruled Austria-Hungary. Therefore, the now truncated Holy Roman Empire began to be informally called the German Reich. In addition to the Kingdom of Prussia, the rest of Germany consisted of small principalities, pursuing an independent policy and largely economically independent, ruled by the Austrian emperor. During the Napoleonic Wars, the defeated Holy Roman Empire was dissolved in 1815, and the Confederation of the Rhine (under the protectorate of Napoleon) was created from its western part, which was replaced in 1701 by the German Confederation - again under the protectorate of the Austrian Empire. It included the principalities of northern and western Germany, as well as two newly formed kingdoms - Bavaria and Saxony. The Kingdom of Prussia (founded in 1806) remained an independent state in 1866 with Berlin as its capital. Thus, the capital of the confederation known as the German Confederation was Frankfurt am Main. Only in the second half of the 18th century did the process of German reunification begin, and in 1871, after the war with Austria, Prussia swallowed up the entire northern part of Germany. On January 1888, 47, after the war with France, the German Empire was created with Prussia as its strongest component. Wilhelm I of Hohenzollern was the first emperor of Germany (earlier emperors bore the title of Roman emperors), and Otto von Bismarck was the chancellor, or prime minister. The new empire was officially called Deutsches Reich, but unofficially called the Second German Reich. In 1918, Frederick III became the second Emperor of Germany for a few months, and was soon succeeded by Wilhelm II. The heyday of the new empire lasted only XNUMX years, and in XNUMX the pride and hopes of the Germans were again buried. The Weimar Republic seemed to the ambitious Germany only a caricature of a state far from superpower status, which was undoubtedly the Holy Roman Empire from the XNUMXth to the XNUMXth century (in the XNUMXth century it began to break up into loosely connected principalities) during the reign of the Ottonian dynasty, then the Hohenstaufen and later the German dynasty empires

Gaugencollern (1871-1918).

Driving school on the chassis of the light tank Panzer I (Panzerkampfwagen), the first production tank of the Third Reich.

For German officers, brought up for several generations in the spirit of a monarchy and a superpower, the emergence of a politicized republic with a limited army was no longer even something humiliating, but a total disaster. Germany fought for so many centuries for dominance on the European continent, considering itself for most of its existence the heir of the Roman Empire, the leading European power, where other countries are just a wild periphery, that it was difficult for them to imagine the humiliating degradation to the role of some kind of middle state. size. Thus, the motivation of German officers to increase the combat capabilities of their armed forces was much higher than that of the much more conservative officer corps of other European countries.

Reichswehr

After the First World War, the German armed forces (Deutsches Heer and Kaiserliche Marine) disintegrated. Some of the soldiers and officers returned home after the announcement of the ceasefire, leaving the service, others joined the Freikorps, i.e. voluntary, fanatical formations that tried to save the remnants of the crumbling empire where they could - in the east, in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Unorganized groups returned to garrisons in Germany, and in the east, the Poles partially disarmed and partially defeated the demoralized German army in battles (for example, in the Wielkopolska Uprising).

On March 6, 1919, the imperial troops were formally disbanded, and in their place, Defense Minister Gustav Noske appointed a new republican armed force, the Reichswehr. Initially, the Reichswehr had about 400 men. man, which in any case was a shadow of the former forces of the Emperor, but soon it had to be reduced to 100 1920 people. This state was reached by the Reichswehr by mid-1872. The Commander of the Reichswehr (Chef der Heeresleitung) was Major General Walter Reinhardt (1930-1920), who succeeded Colonel General Johannes Friedrich "Hans" von Seeckt (1866–1936) in March XNUMX .

In 1928, a contract was signed with Daimler-Benz, Krupp and Rheinmetall-Borsig to build a prototype light tank. Each company had to make two copies.

During World War I, General Hans von Seeckt served as Chief of Staff of Marshal August von Mackensen's 11th Army, fighting in 1915 on the Eastern Front in the Tarnow and Gorlice region, then against Serbia and then Romania - winning both campaigns. Immediately after the war, he led the withdrawal of German troops from Poland, which had regained its independence. After his appointment to a new position, Colonel-General Hans von Seeckt took up with great enthusiasm the organization of a combat-ready, professional armed forces, looking for the possibility of obtaining the maximum combat capabilities of the available forces.

The first step was high-level professionalization - a focus on obtaining the highest possible level of training for all personnel, from privates to generals. The army had to be educated in the traditional, Prussian spirit of the offensive, since, according to von Seeckt, only an offensive, aggressive attitude could ensure victory by defeating the forces of a possible aggressor who would attack Germany. The second was to equip the military with the best weapons, as part of the treaty, to "bend over" wherever possible. There was also an extensive discussion in the Reichswehr about the causes of the defeat in the First World War and the conclusions that could be drawn from this. It was only against the background of these debates that discussions arose about new concepts of warfare at the tactical and operational levels, aimed at developing a new, revolutionary military doctrine that would give the Reichswehr a decisive advantage over stronger but more conservative opponents.

Pictured prepared by Krupp. Both companies were created on the model of the German LK II light tank (1918), which was planned to be put into serial production.

In the field of warfare doctrine, General von Seeckt noted that the large, heavy formations created by a powerful mobilized army are inactive and require constant, intensive supplies. A small, well-trained army gave hope that it could be much more mobile, and logistical support issues would be easier to solve. Von Seeckt's experience in the First World War on fronts where operations were slightly more maneuverable than on the frozen Western front in one place prompted him to look for ways to solve the problem of decisive numerical superiority of the enemy in mobility at the tactical and operational level. A quick, decisive maneuver was supposed to provide a local advantage and use the opportunities - the enemy's weak points, allowing a breakthrough of his defense lines, and then decisive actions in the depths of the defense aimed at paralyzing the enemy's rear. . In order to be able to operate effectively in conditions of high mobility, units at all levels must regulate the interaction between different types of weapons (infantry, cavalry, artillery, sappers and communications). In addition, the troops must be equipped with weapons based on the latest technological developments. Despite a certain conservatism in thinking (von Seeckt was not a supporter of too revolutionary changes in technology and organization of troops, he was afraid of the risk of untested decisions), it was von Seeckt who laid the foundations for the future directions of development of the German armed forces. Back in 1921, under his patronage in the Reichswehr, the instruction “Command and combat combined arms weapons” (Führung und Gefecht der Verbundenen Waffen; FuG) was issued. In this instruction, the emphasis was on offensive actions, decisive, unexpected and quick, aimed at two-sided outflanking the enemy or even a one-sided flank in order to cut him off from supplies and limit his room for maneuver. However, von Seeckt did not hesitate to offer to facilitate this activity through the use of new weapons such as tanks or aircraft. In this respect, he was quite traditional. Rather, he was inclined to obtain a high degree of training, tactical independence and perfect cooperation as guarantors of effective, decisive tactical and operational maneuvers using traditional means of warfare. His views were shared by many officers of the Reichswehr, such as General Friedrich von Theisen (1866-1940), whose articles supported the views of General von Seeckt.

General Hans von Seeckt was not a supporter of revolutionary technical changes and, moreover, did not want to expose Germany to Allied retaliation in the event of a clear violation of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, but already in 1924 he ordered an officer responsible for studying and teaching armored tactics.

In addition to von Seeckt, it is worth mentioning two more theorists of the Weimar Republic who influenced the formation of German strategic thought of that time. Joachim von Stülpnagel (1880-1968; not to be confused with better-known namesakes - Generals Otto von Stülpnagel and Karl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, cousins ​​who successively commanded German troops in occupied France in 1940-1942 and 1942-1944) in 1922- In 1926, he headed the Operational Council of the Truppenamt, i.e. command of the Reichswehr, and later held various command positions: from the commander of an infantry regiment in 1926 to the commander of the Wehrmacht reserve army from 1938 with the rank of lieutenant general. Dismissed from the army after criticizing Hitler's policies in 1938, Joachim von Stülpnagel, an advocate of mobile warfare, introduced into German strategic thought the idea of ​​educating the whole society in the spirit of preparing for war. He went even further - he was a supporter of the development of forces and means for conducting partisan operations behind enemy lines that would attack Germany. He proposed the so-called Volkkrieg - a "people's" war, in which all citizens, morally prepared in peacetime, would face the enemy directly or indirectly - by joining the partisan persecution. Only after the enemy forces were exhausted by guerrilla battles, should the regular offensive of the main regular forces take place, which, using mobility, speed and firepower, were to defeat the weakened enemy units, both on their own territory and on enemy territory, during pursuit of a fleeing enemy. The element of a decisive attack on the weakened enemy troops was an integral part of von Stulpnagel's concept. However, this idea was not developed either in the Reichswehr or in the Wehrmacht.

Wilhelm Gröner (1867-1939), a German officer, served in various staff functions during the war, but in March 1918 he became commander of the 26th Army Corps, which occupied Ukraine, and later chief of staff of the army. On October 1918, 1920, when Erich Ludendorff was dismissed from the post of Deputy Chief of the General Staff, he was replaced by General Wilhelm Groener. He did not hold high positions in the Reichswehr and in 1928 left the army with the rank of lieutenant general. He entered politics, performing, in particular, the functions of the Minister of Transport. Between January 1932 and May XNUMX, he was Minister of Defense of the Weimar Republic.

Wilhelm Groener shared von Seeckt's earlier views that only decisive and quick offensive actions could lead to the destruction of enemy troops and, consequently, to victory. The fighting had to be maneuverable in order to prevent the enemy from building a solid defense. However, Wilhelm Groener also introduced a new element of strategic planning for the Germans - this planning was strictly based on the economic capabilities of the state. He believed that military action should also take into account domestic economic opportunities in order to avoid resource depletion. His actions, aimed at strict financial control over purchases for the military, however, did not meet with understanding from the military, who believed that everything in the state should be subordinated to its defense capability and, if necessary, citizens should be ready to bear the burden of weapons. His successors in the Department of Defense did not share his economic views. Interestingly, Wilhelm Gröner also presented his vision of a future German army with fully motorized cavalry and armored units, as well as infantry equipped with modern anti-tank weapons. Under him, experimental maneuvers began to be carried out with the massive (albeit simulated) use of high-speed formations. One of these exercises was held after Groener left his post, in September 1932, in the Frankfurt an der Oder region. The "blue" side, the defender, was commanded by Lieutenant General Gerd von Rundstedt (1875-1953), commander of the 3rd Infantry Division from Berlin, while the attacking side, heavily equipped with cavalry, motorized and armored formations (except for cavalry, mostly modeled, represented by small motorized units) - Lieutenant General Fedor von Bock, commander of the 2nd Infantry Division from Szczecin. These exercises showed difficulties in maneuvering combined cavalry and motorized units; after their completion, the Germans did not try to create cavalry-mechanized units, which were created in the USSR, and partly in the USA.

Kurt von Schleicher (1882–1934), also a general who remained in the Reichswehr until 1932, served as Minister of Defense from June 1932 to January 1933, and for a short time (December 1932–January 1933) was also Chancellor of Germany. A strong believer in secret weapons, no matter the cost. The first and only "Nazi" Minister of Defense (Minister of War from 1935), Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, oversaw the transformation of the Reichswehr into the Wehrmacht, overseeing the massive expansion of the German armed forces, regardless of the cost of the process. . Werner von Blomberg remained in his position from January 1933 to January 1938, when the War Office was completely liquidated, and on February 4, 1938, the Wehrmacht High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) was appointed, headed by Artillery General Wilhelm Keitel. (since July 1940 - field marshal).

The first German armored theorists

The most famous German theorist of modern mobile warfare is Colonel General Heinz Wilhelm Guderian (1888-1954), author of the famous book Achtung-Panzer! die Entwicklung der Panzerwaffe, ihre Kampftaktik und ihre operan Möglichkeiten” (Attention, tanks! The development of armored forces, their tactics and operational capabilities), published in Stuttgart in 1937. In fact, however, the German concept of using armored forces in battle was developed as a collective work many much lesser known and now forgotten theorists. Moreover, in the initial period - until 1935 - they made a much greater contribution to the development of the German armored forces than the then captain, and later Major Heinz Guderian. He saw a tank for the first time in 1929 in Sweden and before that he had little interest in armored forces. It is worth noting that by this point the Reichswehr had already secretly ordered its first two tanks, and Guderian's participation in this process was zero. The reassessment of his role is probably connected mainly with reading his widely read memoirs “Erinnerungen eines Soldaten” (“Memoirs of a Soldier”), published in 1951, and which to some extent can be compared with the memoirs of Marshal Georgy Zhukov “Memoirs and Reflections ”(Memories of a Soldier) in 1969 - by glorifying their own achievements. And although Heinz Guderian undoubtedly made a great contribution to the development of the armored forces of Germany, it is necessary to mention those who were eclipsed by his inflated myth and ousted from the memory of historians.

Heavy tanks were similar in appearance, but differed in the design of the transmission, suspension and steering system. The top photo is a Krupp prototype, the bottom photo is Rheinmetall-Borsig.

The first recognized German theorist of armored operations was Lieutenant (later Lieutenant Colonel) Ernst Volkheim (1898-1962), who served in the Kaiser army from 1915, rose to the first officer rank in 1916. From 1917 he served in the artillery corps, and from April 1918 he entered the service in the first German armored formations. So he was a tanker during the First World War, and in the new Reichswehr he was assigned to the transport service - Kraftfahrtruppe. In 1923 he was transferred to the Inspectorate of the Transport Service, where he studied the use of tanks in modern warfare. Already in 1923, his first book, Die deutschen Kampfwagen im Weltkriege (German tanks in the First World War), was published in Berlin, in which he spoke about the experience of using tanks on the battlefield, and his personal experience as a company commander was also useful. tanks in 1918. A year later, his second book, Der Kampfwagen in der heutigen Kriegführung (Tanks in modern warfare), was published, which can be considered the first German theoretical work on the use of armored forces in modern warfare. During this period, in the Reichswehr, infantry was still considered the main striking force, and tanks - a means of supporting and protecting the actions of the infantry on a par with engineer troops or communications. Ernst Volkheim argued that tanks were underestimated in Germany already during the First World War and that armored forces could form the main striking force, while infantry followed the tanks, occupied the area and consolidated what had been achieved. Volkheim also used the argument that if tanks were of little value on the battlefield, then why did the Allies forbid the Germans from having them? He believed that tank formations could withstand any type of enemy troops on land and could be used in different ways. According to him, the main type of armored combat vehicle should be a medium-weight tank, which, while maintaining its mobility on the battlefield, would also be heavily armed with a cannon capable of destroying any objects on the battlefield, including enemy tanks. Regarding the interaction between tanks and infantry, Ernst Volkheim boldly stated that tanks should be their main striking force and infantry should be their main secondary weapon. In the Reichswehr, where infantry was supposed to dominate the battlefield, such a view - about the auxiliary role of infantry in relation to armored formations - was interpreted as heresy.

In 1925, Lieutenant Volkheim was admitted to the officers' school in Dresden, where he lectured on armored tactics. In the same year, his third book, Der Kampfwagen und Abwehr dagegen (Tanks and anti-tank defense), was published, which discussed the tactics of tank units. In this book, he also expressed the opinion that the development of technology will allow the production of fast, reliable, well-armed and armored tanks with high cross-country ability. Equipped with radios to control them effectively, they will be able to operate independently of the main forces, taking maneuver warfare to a whole new level. He also wrote that in the future it will be possible to develop a whole line of armored vehicles designed to solve a variety of tasks. They had to protect the actions of tanks, for example, by transporting infantry, having the same cross-country ability and a similar speed of action. In his new book, he also drew attention to the need for "ordinary" infantry to organize an effective anti-tank defense - by adopting an appropriate grouping, camouflage and installation of guns capable of destroying tanks in the intended directions of enemy tanks. He also stressed the importance of infantry training in terms of maintaining calm and morale when meeting with enemy tanks.

In 1932-1933, Captain Volkheim was an instructor at the Kama Soviet-German armored school in Kazan, where he also trained Soviet armored officers. At the same time, he also published many articles in "Tygodnik Wojskowy" (Militär Wochenblatt). In 1940 he was commander of the Panzer-Abteilung zbV 40 tank battalion operating in Norway, and in 1941 he became commander of the Panzertruppenschule school in Wünsdorf, where he remained until 1942, when he retired.

Despite initial resistance, Volkheim's views began to find more and more fertile ground in the Reichswehr, and among those who at least partly shared his views was Colonel Werner von Fritsch (1888-1939; from 1932 major of the troops, from February 1934 commander of the Land Forces (Obeerkommando des Heeres; OKH) with the rank of lieutenant general, and finally colonel general, as well as major general Werner von Blomberg (1878-1946; later field marshal), then chief of training of the Reichswehr, from 1933 Minister of War, and since 1935 also the first Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces (Wehrmacht, OKW) Their views, of course, were not so radical, but both of them supported the development of armored forces - as one of the many tools to strengthen the shock group of German troops In one of his articles in the Militär Wochenblatt, Werner von Fritsch wrote that tanks are likely to be the decisive weapon at the operational level and from an operational point of view they will be most effective if organized in large units such as armored brigades. In turn, Werner von Blomberg in October 1927 prepared instructions for training armored regiments that did not exist at that time. Guderian in his memoirs accuses both of the above generals of conservatism when it comes to the use of fast troops, but this is not true - just the complex nature of Guderian, his complacency and eternal criticism of his superiors that throughout his military career relations with his superiors were at least strained. Anyone who did not fully agree with him, Guderian accused in his memoirs of backwardness and misunderstanding of the principles of modern warfare.

Major (later Major General) Ritter Ludwig von Radlmeier (1887-1943) was an officer in the 10th Bavarian Infantry Regiment from 1908, and at the end of the war also an officer in the German armored units. After the war, he returned to the infantry, but in 1924 he was assigned to one of the seven transport battalions of the Reichswehr - the 7th (Bayerischen) Kraftfahr-Abteilung. These battalions were formed according to the Reichswehr's organizational charts, drawn up in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, for the purpose of supplying infantry divisions. However, in fact, they became universal motorized formations, since their fleet of various vehicles, from trucks of various sizes to motorcycles and even a few (allowed by the treaty) armored cars, was widely used in the first experiments with the mechanization of the army. It was these battalions that demonstrated models of tanks used in the Reichswehr for training in anti-tank defense, as well as for practicing the tactics of armored forces. On the one hand, officers with previous experience with mechanization (including former imperial tankers) entered these battalions, and on the other, officers from other branches of the military, for punishment. In the minds of the German high command, the motor transport battalions were, to some extent, the successors of the Kaiser's rolling stock services. According to the Prussian military spirit, an officer should carry out honorable service in the ranks, and caravans were sent as a punishment, this was interpreted as something between the usual disciplinary sanction and a military tribunal. Fortunately for the Reichswehr, the image of these motor transport battalions was gradually changing, along with the attitude towards these rear units as the seeds of the future mechanization of the army.

In 1930, Major von Radlmayer was transferred to the Inspectorate of the Transport Service. During this period, that is, in 1925-1933, he repeatedly traveled to the United States, getting acquainted with American achievements in the field of tank building and the creation of the first armored units. Major von Radlmeier collected information for the Reichswehr on the development of armored forces abroad, providing them with his own conclusions regarding the future development of German armored forces. Since 1930, Major von Radlmayer was the commander of the Kama school of armored forces in Kazan in the USSR (Direktor der Kampfwagenschule "Kama"). In 1931 he was replaced by a major. Josef Harpe (commander of the 5th Panzer Army during World War II) and "removed" by his superiors from the Inspectorate of the Transport Service. Only in 1938 he was appointed commander of the 6th and then the 5th armored brigades, and in February 1940 he became the commander of the 4th armored division. He was removed from command in June 1940 when his division was arrested by the French defenses at Lille; retired in 1941 and died

due to illness in 1943.

Major Oswald Lutz (1876-1944) may not have been a theorist in the strict sense of the word, but in fact it was he, and not Guderian, who was actually the "father" of the German armored forces. Since 1896, a sapper officer, during the 21st World War he served in the railway troops. After the war, he was the head of the transport service of the 7th Infantry Brigade, and after the reorganization of the Reichswehr, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, he became the commander of the 1927th transport battalion, in which (by the way, as a penalty) also cap. Heinz Guderian. In 1, Lutz moved to the headquarters of Army Group No. 1931 in Berlin, and in 1936 he became an inspector of transport troops. His chief of staff was Major Heinz Guderian; both were soon promoted: Oswald Lutz to major general, and Guderian to lieutenant colonel. Oswald Lutz held his position until February 1938, when he was appointed commander of the Wehrmacht's first armored corps, the 1936 Army Corps. Retired at 1 year old. When in 1935 Colonel Werner Kempf became his successor in the inspectorate, his position was already called Inspekteur der Kraftfahrkampftruppen und für Heeresmotorisierung, that is, inspector of the transport service and motorization of the army. Oswald Lutz was the first general to receive the rank of "general of the armored forces" (November XNUMX XNUMX), and for this reason alone he can be considered "the first tanker of the Wehrmacht". As we have already said, Lutz was not a theoretician, but an organizer and administrator - it was under his direct leadership that the first German tank divisions were created.

Heinz Guderian - an icon of the German armored forces

Heinz Wilhelm Guderian was born on June 17, 1888 in Chelmno on the Vistula, in what was then East Prussia, into the family of a professional officer. In February 1907 he became a cadet of the 10th Hanoverian Egrov battalion, commanded by his father, lieutenant. Friedrich Guderian, a year later he became a second lieutenant. In 1912, he wanted to enroll in machine gun courses, but on the advice of his father - at that time he was already a general. major and commanders 35. Infantry brigades - completed a radio communications course. Radios represented the pinnacle of military technology of the time, and this is how Heinz Guderian acquired useful technical knowledge. In 1913, he began training at the Military Academy in Berlin as the youngest cadet (among whom was, in particular, Eric Manstein). At the academy, Guderian was greatly influenced by one of the lecturers, Colonel Prince Rüdiger von der Goltz. The outbreak of the First World War interrupted Guderian's training, who was transferred to the 5th Radio Communications Unit. A cavalry division that took part in the initial German advance through the Ardennes into France. The limited experience of the Imperial Army's senior commanders meant that Guderian's unit was largely unused. During the retreat from the Battle of the Marne in September 1914, Guderian was nearly captured by the French when his entire force crashed in the village of Bethenville. After this event, he was seconded to the 4th Army's communications department in Flanders, where he witnessed the Germans' use of mustard gas at Ypres in April 1914. His next assignment was the intelligence department of the 5th headquarters. Army battles near Verdun. The battle of destruction (materialschlacht) made a great negative impression on Guderian. In his head there was a conviction about the superiority of maneuver actions, which could contribute to the defeat of the enemy in a more effective way than trench massacre. In mid-1916 from. Guderian was transferred to the Fourth Army Headquarters in Flanders, also to the reconnaissance division. Here he was in September 4. witness (though not an eyewitness) to the first use of tanks by the British at the Battle of the Somme. However, this did not make much of an impression on him - then he did not pay attention to tanks as a weapon of the future. In April 1916, at the Battle of Aisne, he observed the use of French tanks as a scout, but again did not attract much attention. In February 1917 from. After completing the relevant course, Guderian became an officer of the General Staff, and in May 1918 - quartermaster of the XXXVIII Reserve Corps, with whom he took part in the summer offensive of the German troops, which was soon stopped by the Allies. With great interest, Guderian watched the use of the new German assault group - stormtroopers, specially trained infantry to break through enemy lines with small forces, with minimal support. In mid-September 1918, Captain Guderian was assigned to the mission of liaison between the German army and the Austro-Hungarian forces fighting on the Italian front.

In 1928, a tank battalion was formed from the purchased Strv m / 21. Guderian stopped there in 1929, probably his first direct contact with tanks.

Immediately after the war, Guderian remained in the army, and in 1919 he was sent - as a representative of the General Staff - to the "Iron Division" Freikorps (a German volunteer formation that fought in the east to establish the most favorable borders of Germany) under the command of Major Rüdiger von der Goltz, his former lecturer at the Military Academy. The division fought the Bolsheviks in the Baltics, captured Riga and continued fighting in Latvia. When the government of the Weimar Republic accepted the Treaty of Versailles in the summer of 1919, it ordered the Freikorps troops to withdraw from Latvia and Lithuania, but the Iron Division did not obey. Captain Guderian, instead of fulfilling his control duties on behalf of the Reichswehr command, supported von Goltz. For this disobedience, he was transferred to the 10th brigade of the new Reichswehr as a company commander, and then in January 1922 - as part of the further "hardening" - seconded to the 7th Bavarian motor transport battalion. Captain Guderian understood the instructions during the 1923 coup in Munich (the location of the battalion)

away from politics.

While serving in a battalion commanded by a major and later a lieutenant. Oswald Lutz, Guderian became interested in mechanical transport as a means of increasing the mobility of troops. In several articles in Militär Wochenblatt, he wrote about the possibility of transporting infantry and trucks to increase their mobility on the battlefield. At one point, he even suggested converting the existing cavalry divisions into motorized divisions, which, of course, did not appeal to the cavalry.

In 1924, Captain Guderian was assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division in Szczecin, where he was an instructor in tactics and military history. The new assignment forced Guderian to study both of these disciplines more thoroughly, leading to his later career. During this period, he became a growing proponent of mechanization, which he saw as a means of increasing the maneuverability of troops. In January 1927, Guderian was promoted to major, and in October he was assigned to the transport department of the Operations Department of the Truppenamt. In 1929, he visited Sweden, where for the first time in his life he met a tank - the Swedish M21. The Swedes even let him lead it. Most likely, from this moment Guderian's increased interest in tanks began.

When in the spring of 1931, Major General Oswald Lutz became head of the transport service, he recruited the major. Guderian as his chief of staff, soon promoted to lieutenant colonel. It was this team that organized the first German armored divisions. However, it is important to remember who was the boss and who was the subordinate.

In October 1935, when the first armored divisions were formed, the Transport Service Inspectorate was transformed into the Transport and Mechanization Inspectorate (Inspektion der Kraftfahrkampftruppen und für Heeresmotorisierung). When the first three Panzer divisions were formed, Major General Heinz Guderian was appointed commander of the 2nd Armored Division. Until then, that is, in 1931-1935, the development of regular schemes for new armored divisions and the preparation of charters for their use was primarily the task of Major General (later Lieutenant General) Oswald Lutz, of course with the help of Guderian.

In the autumn of 1936, Oswald Lutz persuaded Guderian to write a book on a jointly developed concept for the use of armored forces. Oswald Lutz did not have time to write it himself, he dealt with too many organizational, apparatus and personnel issues, which is why he asked Guderian about it. Writing a book setting out a jointly developed position on the concept of the use of fast forces would undoubtedly bring glory to the author, but Lutz was only concerned with spreading the idea of ​​​​mechanization and waging mechanized mobile warfare as a counterweight to the enemy's numerical superiority. This was to develop the mechanized units that Oswald Lutz intended to create.

Heinz Guderian used in his book previously prepared notes of his lectures in the 2nd Infantry Division in Szczecin, especially in the part concerning the history of the use of armored forces during the First World War. He then spoke about the achievements in the post-war development of armored forces in other countries, dividing this part into technical achievements, tactical achievements and anti-tank developments. Against this background, he presented - in the next part - the development of mechanized troops in Germany so far. In the next part, Guderian discusses the experience of combat use of tanks in several battles of the First World War.

Panzer I tanks were baptized during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). They were used in front-line units until 1941.

The last part was the most important, concerning the principles of the use of mechanized troops in modern armed conflict. In the first chapter on defense, Guderian argued that any defense, even fortified, can be defeated as a result of maneuvering, since each has its own weak points where a breakthrough of defensive lines is possible. Going to the rear of a static defense paralyzes the enemy forces. Guderian did not see defense as an action of any importance in modern warfare. He believed that actions should be carried out in a maneuverable manner at all times. He even preferred a tactical retreat in order to break away from the enemy, regroup his own forces and return to offensive operations. This view, obviously erroneous, was the cause of its collapse in December 1941. When the German offensive stalled at the gates of Moscow, Hitler ordered the German troops to move on to permanent defense, using the villages and settlements as fortified areas on which to build. This was the most correct decision, as it made it possible to bleed the enemy at a lower cost than in the case of an unsuccessful “hitting the head against the wall”. The German troops could no longer continue the offensive due to previous losses, a sharp reduction in manpower and equipment, depletion of rear resources and simple fatigue. The defense would make it possible to preserve the gains, and at the same time would give time to replenish the personnel and equipment of the troops, restore supplies, repair damaged equipment, etc. All this order was carried out by everyone except the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, Colonel General Heinz Guderian, who continued to retreat against orders. The commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, with whom Guderian had been in bitter conflict since the Polish campaign of 1939, was simply furious. After another quarrel, Guderian resigned, awaiting a request to remain in office, which, however, was accepted by von Klug and accepted by Hitler. Surprised, Guderian landed without appointment for another two years and never again held any command function, so he had no opportunity to be promoted to field marshal.

In the chapter on the offensive, Guderian writes that the strength of modern defenses prevents infantry from breaking through enemy lines and that traditional infantry has lost its value on the modern battlefield. Only well-armored tanks are capable of breaking through enemy defenses, overcoming barbed wire and trenches. The rest of the branches of the military will play the role of auxiliary weapons against tanks, because the tanks themselves have their own limitations. Infantry occupies and holds the area, artillery destroys enemy strong points of resistance and supports the armament of tanks in the fight against enemy forces, sappers remove minefields and other obstacles, build crossings, and signal units must provide effective control in motion, since actions must be constantly agile. . All these support forces must be able to accompany the tanks in the attack, so they must also have the appropriate equipment. The basic principles of the tactics of tank operations are surprise, the unification of forces and the correct use of the terrain. Interestingly, Guderian paid little attention to reconnaissance, probably believing that a mass of tanks could crush any enemy. He did not see the fact that the defender could also surprise the attacker by disguising himself and organizing

appropriate ambushes.

It is generally accepted that Guderian was a supporter of combined weapons, consisting of a team of “tanks - motorized infantry - motorized rifle artillery - motorized sappers - motorized communications”. In fact, however, Guderian considered tanks to be the main branch of the military, and assigned the rest to the role of auxiliary weapons. This led, as in the USSR and Great Britain, to an overload of tactical formations with tanks, which was corrected during the war. Almost everyone has moved from a 2+1+1 system (two armored units to one infantry unit and one artillery unit (plus smaller reconnaissance, engineer, communications, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and service units) to a 1+1 + 1 ratio. For example, in The modified structure of the US armored division consisted of three tank battalions, three motorized infantry battalions (on armored personnel carriers) and three self-propelled artillery squadrons.The British divisions had an armored brigade (additionally with one motorized rifle battalion on an armored personnel carrier), a motorized infantry brigade (on trucks) and two artillery divisions (traditionally called regiments), so in battalions it looked like this: three tanks, four infantry, two squadrons of field artillery (self-propelled and motorized), a reconnaissance battalion, an anti-tank company, an anti-aircraft company, an engineer battalion, a communications and service battalion. their armored corps had nine tank battalions (comprising three tank brigades), six motorized infantry battalions (one in a tank brigade and three in a mechanized brigade) and three self-propelled artillery squadrons (called regiments) plus a reconnaissance engineer, communications, army battalion company and services. However, at the same time, they formed mechanized corps with an inverse proportion of infantry and tanks (16 to 9 per battalion, with each mechanized brigade having a battalion-sized tank regiment). Guderian preferred to create divisions with two tank regiments (two battalions of four companies each, sixteen tank companies in each division), a motorized regiment and a motorcycle battalion - a total of nine infantry companies on trucks and motorcycles, an artillery regiment with two divisions - six artillery batteries , sapper battalion, communications and service battalion. The proportions between tanks, infantry and artillery were - according to Guderian's recipe - the following (by company): 6 + 1943 + 1945. Even in XNUMX-XNUMX, as Inspector General of Armored Forces, he still insisted on increasing the number of tanks in armored divisions and a senseless return to old proportions.

The author devoted only a short paragraph to the question of the relationship between tanks and aviation (because it is difficult to talk about cooperation in what Guderian wrote), which can be summarized as follows: aircraft are important because they can conduct reconnaissance and destroy objects in the direction of attack of armored units, tanks can to paralyze the activity of enemy aviation by quickly capturing its airfields in the front line, we will not overestimate Douai, the strategic role of aviation is only an auxiliary role, and not decisive. That's all. No mention of air control, no mention of air defense of armored units, no mention of close air support for troops. Guderian did not like aviation and did not appreciate its role until the end of the war and beyond. When, in the pre-war period, exercises were conducted on the interaction of dive bombers directly supporting armored divisions, this was at the initiative of the Luftwaffe, and not the Ground Forces. It was during this period, that is, from November 1938 to August 1939, that the commander-in-chief of the fast troops (Chef der Schnellen Truppen) was Panzer General Heinz Guderian, and it is worth adding that this was the same position held by Oswald Lutz until 1936 . - just the Inspectorate of Transport and Automobile Troops changed its name in 1934 to the Headquarters of the Fast Troops (the name of the Command of the Fast Troops was also used, but this is the same headquarters). Thus, in 1934, the creation of a new kind of troops was authorized - fast troops (since 1939, fast and armored troops, which formally turned the authorities into command). The Command of Rapid and Armored Forces operated under this name until the end of the war. However, looking ahead a little, it must be stated that the traditional German order was severely disrupted under the rule of Hitler, since on February 28, 1943, the General Inspectorate of the Armored Forces (Generalinspektion der Panzertruppen) was created, acting independently of the Command of the Supreme and Armored Forces with almost identical powers. During its existence until May 8, 1945, the General Inspectorate had only one chief - Colonel General S. Heinz Guderian and only one chief of staff, Lieutenant General Wolfgang Thomale. At that time, General of the Armored Forces Heinrich Eberbach was at the head of the High Command and the Command of the Armored Forces, and from August 1944 until the end of the war, General of the Armored Forces Leo Freiherr Geir von Schweppenburg. The position of inspector general was probably created specifically for Guderian, for whom Hitler had an odd weakness, as evidenced by the fact that after his dismissal from the post of commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, he received an unprecedented severance pay equal to 50 years of salary general in his position (the equivalent of about 600 monthly salaries).

The first German tanks

One of the colonel's predecessors. Lutz as head of the Transport Service was Artillery General Alfred von Vollard-Bockelberg (1874-1945), a supporter of transforming it into a new, combat arm. He was Inspector of the Transport Service from October 1926 to May 1929, later succeeded by Lieutenant General Otto von Stülpnagel (not to be confused with the aforementioned Joachim von Stülpnagel), and in April 1931 he succeeded Oswald Lutz, who during von Stülpnagel's time was Chief of Staff inspections. Inspired by Alfred von Vollard-Bockelberg, the exercises were conducted using dummy tanks on trucks. These models were installed on Hanomag trucks or Dixi cars, and already in 1927 (this year the International Control Commission left Germany) several companies of these tank models were created. They were used not only for training in anti-tank defense (mainly artillery), but also for the exercises of other branches of the armed forces in cooperation with tanks. Tactical experiments were carried out with their use in order to determine how best to use tanks on the battlefield, although at that time the Reichswehr did not yet have tanks.

With the development of Ausf. c, the Panzer II adopted a typical appearance. The Panzer I style suspension concept was abandoned with the introduction of 5 large road wheels.

However, soon, despite the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, the Reichswehr began to claim them. In April 1926, the Reichswehr Heereswaffenamt (Reichswehr Heereswaffenamt), led by artilleryman Major General Erich Freiherr von Botzheim, prepared requirements for a medium tank to break through enemy defenses. According to the German tank concept of the 15s, developed by Ernst Volkheim, the heavier tanks were to lead the attack, followed by the infantry in close support of the light tanks. The requirements specified a vehicle with a mass of 40 tons and a speed of 75 km / h, armed with a XNUMX-mm infantry cannon in a rotating turret and two machine guns.

The new tank was officially called the Armeewagen 20, but most of the camouflage documents used the name "big tractor" - Großtraktor. In March 1927, a contract for its construction was awarded to three companies: Daimler-Benz from Marienfelde in Berlin, Rheinmetall-Borsig from Düsseldorf and Krupp from Essen. Each of these companies built two prototypes, named (respectively) Großtraktor I (nos. 41 and 42), Großtraktor II (nos. 43 and 44) ​​and Großtraktor III (nos. 45 and 46). All of them had similar design features, as they were modeled after the Swedish light tank Stridsvagn M / 21 by AB Landsverk from Landskrona, which, by the way, was used by the German tank builder Otto Merker (since 1929). The Germans bought one of ten tanks of this type, and the M/21 itself was actually a German LK II built in 1921, which, however, for obvious reasons, could not be produced in Germany.

Großtraktor tanks were made from ordinary steel, and not from armored steel for technological reasons. A turret with a 75 mm L/24 cannon and a 7,92 mm Dreyse machine gun was mounted in front of it. The second such gun was placed in the second tower in the stern of the tank. All these machines were delivered to the Kama training ground in the USSR in the summer of 1929. In September 1933 they returned to Germany and were included in the experimental and training unit in Zossen. In 1937, these tanks were taken out of service and mostly placed as memorials in various German armored units.

Although the Panzer II light tank received a solid undercarriage, its armor and armament quickly ceased to meet the requirements of the battlefield (by the beginning of the war, 1223 tanks had been produced).

Another type of Reichswehr tank was the infantry-compatible VK 31, which was called the "light tractor" - Leichttraktor. Requirements for this tank were put forward in March 1928. It was supposed to be armed with a 37 mm L / 45 cannon in the turret and a 7,92 mm Dreyse machine gun placed nearby, with a mass of 7,5 tons. The required maximum speed is 40 km/h on roads and 20 km/h off-road. This time, Daimler-Benz refused the order, so Krupp and Rheinmetall-Borsig (two each) built four prototypes of this car. In 1930, these vehicles also went to Kazan, and then returned to Germany in 1933, with the liquidation of the Kama Soviet-German armored school.

In 1933, an attempt was also made to build a heavy (by modern standards) tank to break through the defense, the successor to the Großtraktor. Tank projects were developed by Rheinmetall and Krupp. As required, the tanks, called Neubaufahrzeug, had a main turret with two guns - a short-barreled universal 75 mm L / 24 and an anti-tank gun of 37 mm L / 45 caliber. Rheinmetall placed them in the turret one above the other (37 mm higher), and Krupp placed them next to each other. In addition, in both versions, two additional towers with one 7,92-mm machine gun in each were installed on the hull. Rheinmetall vehicles were designated PanzerKampfwagen NeubauFahrzeug V (PzKpfw NbFz V), Krupp and PzKpfw NbFz VI. In 1934, Rheinmetall built two PzKpfw NbFz V with its own turret made of ordinary steel, and in 1935-1936, three PzKpfw NbFz VI prototypes with Krupp's armored steel turret. The last three vehicles were used in the Norwegian campaign of 1940. The construction of the Neubaufahrzeug was recognized as unsuccessful and the machines did not go into mass production.

The Panzerkampfwagen I became the first tank actually massively put into service with German armored units. It was the light tank that was supposed to form the backbone of the planned armored units due to the possibility of mass production. The final requirements for the van, originally called the Kleintraktor (small tractor), were built in September 1931. Already at that time, Oswald Lutz and Heinz Guderian planned the development and production of two types of combat vehicles for future armored divisions, the formation of which Lutz began to force at the very beginning of his tenure in 1931. Oswald Lutz believed that the core of the armored divisions should be medium tanks armed with a 75 mm cannon, supported by faster reconnaissance and anti-tank vehicles armed with 50 mm anti-tank guns. tank guns. Since German industry had to first acquire the relevant experience, it was decided to purchase a cheap light tank that would allow training personnel for future armored divisions, and industrial enterprises to prepare the appropriate production facilities for tanks and specialists. Such a decision was a forced situation, besides, it was believed that the appearance of a tank with relatively low combat capabilities would not alert the Allies about the radical retreat of the Germans from the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Hence the requirements for the Kleintraktor, later called the Landwirtschaftlicher Schlepper (LaS), an agricultural tractor. Under this name, the tank was known until 1938, when a unified marking system for armored vehicles was introduced in the Wehrmacht and the vehicle received the designation PzKpfw I (SdKfz 101). In 1934, mass production of the car began simultaneously at several factories; the basic version of the Ausf A had 1441 built, and the upgraded version of the Ausf B over 480, including several rebuilt from early Ausf A's that were stripped of their superstructure and turret, were used for driver and maintenance mechanic training. It was these tanks that in the second half of the 1942s allowed the formation of armored divisions and, contrary to their intentions, were used in combat operations - they fought until XNUMX in Spain, Poland, France, the Balkans, the USSR and North Africa. However, their combat value was low, since they had only two machine guns and weak armor, which protected only from small arms bullets.

The Panzer I and Panzer II were too small to carry a larger long range radio. Therefore, a command tank was created to support their actions.

Kama armored school

On April 16, 1922, two European states that felt excluded in the international arena - Germany and the USSR - signed in Rapallo, Italy, an agreement on mutual economic cooperation. What little is known is the fact that this agreement also had a secret military application; on its basis, in the second half of the XNUMXs, several centers were created in the USSR, where training was conducted and mutual experience was exchanged in the field of weapons prohibited in Germany.

From the point of view of our topic, the Kama tank school, located at the Kazan training ground, on the Kama River, is important. After the successful completion of negotiations for its establishment, Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm Malbrandt (1875–1955), former commander of the transport battalion of the 2nd (Preußische) Kraftfahr-Abteilung from Szczecin, began looking for a suitable location. Created in early 1929, the center received the code name "Kama", which did not come from the name of the river, but from the abbreviation Kazan-Malbrandt. The Soviet school staff came from the NKVD, not the army, and the Germans sent officers to the school with some experience or knowledge in the use of tanks. As for the school's equipment, it was almost exclusively German - six Großtraktor tanks and four Leichttraktor tanks, as well as several armored cars, trucks and cars. The Soviets, for their part, provided only three British-made Carden-Loyd tankettes (which were later produced in the USSR as the T-27), and then another five MS-1 light tanks from the 3rd Kazan Tank Regiment. The vehicles at the school were assembled into four companies: in the 1st company - armored vehicles, in the 2nd company - models of tanks and unarmored vehicles, the 3rd company - anti-tank, the 4th company - motorcycle.

In three consecutive courses, held from March 1929 to the summer of 1933, the Germans trained a total of 30 officers. The first course was attended by 10 officers from both countries, but the Soviets sent a total of about 100 students for the next two courses. Unfortunately, most of them are unknown, since in Soviet documents the officers took Ossoaviakhim courses (Defense League). On the part of the USSR, the commandant of the courses was Colonel Vasily Grigorievich Burkov, later a lieutenant general of the armored forces. Semyon A. Ginzburg, later an armored vehicle designer, was among the school's technical staff on the Soviet side. On the German side, Wilhelm Malbrandt, Ludwig Ritter von Radlmayer and Josef Harpe were successively commanders of the Kama tank school - by the way, a first-year participant. Among the graduates of Kama were subsequently Lieutenant General Wolfgang Thomale, Chief of the General Staff of the Inspectorate of the Armored Forces in 1943-1945, Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm von Thoma, later General of the Armored Forces and commander of the Afrika Korps, who was captured by the British at the Battle of El Alamein in November 1942, later Lieutenant General Viktor Linnarts, who commanded the 26th Panzer Division at the end of the war, or Lieutenant General Johann Haarde, commander of the 1942nd Panzer Division in 1943-25. First-year participant, Captain Fritz Kühn from the transport battalion of the 6th (Preußische) Kraftfahr-Abteilung from Hannover, later General of the Armored Forces, from March 1941 to July 1942 commanded the 14th Panzer Division.

The role of the Kama armored school in Kazan is greatly overestimated in the literature. Only 30 officers completed the course, and apart from Josef Harpe, Wilhelm von Thoma and Wolfgang Thomale, not one of them became a great tank commander, commanding a formation of more than a division. However, on their return to Germany, these thirty or ten instructors were the only ones in Germany who had fresh experience in operation and tactical exercises with real tanks.

Creation of the first armored units

The first armored unit formed in Germany during the interwar period was a training company at the training center Kraftfahrlehrkommando Zossen (commanded by Major Josef Harpe), in a town about 40 km south of Berlin. Between Zossen and Wünsdorf there was a large training ground, which facilitated the training of tankers. Literally a few kilometers to the southwest is the Kummersdorf training ground, the former Prussian artillery training ground. Initially, the training company in Zossen had four Grosstractors (two Daimler-Benz vehicles were seriously damaged and probably remained in the USSR) and four Leuchtractors, which returned from the USSR in September 1933, and at the end of the year also received ten LaS chassis (trial series later PzKpfw I) without an armored superstructure and turret, which were used to train drivers and simulate armored vehicles. Deliveries of the new LaS chassis began in January and were increasingly used for training. In early 1934, Adolf Hitler visited the Zossen training ground and was shown several machines in action. He liked the show, and in the presence of the major. Lutz and Col. Guderian opined: this is what I need. Hitler's recognition paved the way for a more extensive mechanization of the army, which was included in the first plans to turn the Reichswehr into a regular armed force. The number of peaceful states was expected to rise to 700. (seven times), with the possibility of mobilizing three and a half million army. It was assumed that in peacetime XNUMX corps directorates and XNUMX divisions would be retained.

On the advice of the theorists, it was decided to immediately begin the creation of large armored formations. Especially Guderian, who was supported by Hitler, insisted on this. In July 1934, the command of the Fast Troops (Kommando der Schnelletruppen, also known as Inspektion 6, hence the name of the chiefs) was created, which took over the functions of the Inspectorate of Transport and Automobile Troops, remaining practically the same command and staff headed by Lutz and Guderian in as chief of staff. On October 12, 1934, consultations began on the project developed by this command for the regular scheme of an experimental armored division - Versuchs Panzer Division. It was to consist of two armored regiments, a motorized rifle regiment, a motorcycle battalion, a light artillery regiment, an anti-tank battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, a communications battalion and a sapper company. So it was an organization very similar to the future organization of armored divisions. A two-battalion organization was established in the regiments, so the number of combat battalions and artillery squadrons was less than in a rifle division (nine rifle battalions, four artillery squadrons, reconnaissance battalion, anti-tank division - only fifteen), and in an armored division - four armored divisions (three two on trucks and one on motorcycles), two artillery squadrons, a reconnaissance battalion and an anti-tank battalion - eleven in all. As a result of consultations, teams of brigades were added - armored and motorized infantry.

Meanwhile, on November 1, 1934, with the arrival of LaS tanks (PzKpfw I Ausf A), including more than a hundred chassis without superstructures, as well as combat vehicles with a turret with two 7,92-mm machine guns, a training company in Zossen and a training the company of the newly created tank school in Ohrdruf (a city in Thuringia, 30 km southwest of Erfurt) was expanded to full tank regiments - Kampfwagen-Regiment 1 and Kampfwagen-Regiment 2 (respectively). Each regiment had two battalion tanks, and each battalion - four tank companies. It was assumed that in the end, three companies in the battalion would have light tanks - until they were replaced by targeted medium tanks, and the fourth company would have support vehicles, i.e. the first tanks armed with 75 mm L/24 short-barreled guns and anti-tank guns were tank vehicles with guns (as it was originally supposed) of 50 mm caliber. As for the latest vehicles, the lack of a 50-mm cannon promptly forced the temporary use of 37-mm anti-tank guns, which then became the standard anti-tank weapon of the German army. None of these vehicles even existed in prototypes, so initially the fourth companies were equipped with tank models.

The Panzer III and Panzer IV medium tanks were the second generation of German armored vehicles prior to World War II. Pictured is a Panzer III tank.

On March 16, 1935, the German government introduced statutory military service, in connection with which the Reichswehr changed its name to the Wehrmacht - Defense Forces. This paved the way for a clear return to armament. Already in August 1935, experimental exercises were carried out using an impromptu armored division, "assembled" from various parts, to test the correctness of the organizational plan. The experimental division was commanded by Major General Oswald Lutz. The exercise involved 12 officers and soldiers, 953 wheeled vehicles and an additional 4025 tracked vehicles (except tanks - artillery tractors). The organizational assumptions were generally confirmed, although it was decided that a company of sappers for such a large unit was not enough - they decided to deploy it into a battalion. Of course, Guderian had few tanks, so he insisted on upgrading the armored brigade to two three-battalion regiments or three two-battalion regiments, and better three three-battalion regiments in the future. It was supposed to become the main strike force of the division, and the rest of the units and subunits to perform auxiliary and combat functions.

First three armored divisions

On October 1, 1935, the headquarters of three armored divisions were officially formed. Their creation was associated with significant organizational costs, as it required the transfer of many officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers to new positions. The commanders of these divisions were: Lieutenant General Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs zu Glon (1st Armored Division in Weimar), Major General Heinz Guderian (2nd Division in Würzburg) and Lieutenant General Ernst Fessmann (3rd Division in Wünsdorf near Zossen). The 1st Armored Division was the easiest, since it mainly consisted of units that formed an experimental armored division during maneuvers in August 1935. Its 1st Armored Regiment included the 1st Tank Regiment, renamed from the 2nd Panzer Regiment Ohrdruf, former 1st Panzer Regiment Zossen. The tank regiment was renamed the 5th Tank Regiment and incorporated into the 3rd Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Tank Division. The remaining tank regiments were created from separate elements from the other two regiments, from the personnel of transport battalions and from cavalry regiments, cavalry divisions, and so were planned to be disbanded. Since 1938, these regiments have received new tanks, known as PzKpfw I, directly from the factories that produced them, as well as other equipment, mostly automotive, mostly brand new. Firstly, the 1st and 2nd Panzer Divisions were completed, which were supposed to reach combat readiness in April 1936, and secondly, the 3rd Panzer Division, which, therefore, should have been ready by the fall of 1936 . it took much longer to recruit new divisions with men and equipment, while training was carried out with those elements that were already equipped.

Simultaneously with the three armored divisions, Lieutenant General Lutz planned to form three separate armored brigades, intended primarily to support infantry operations. Although these brigades were supposed to be created in 1936, 1937 and 1938, in fact, recruiting equipment and people for them took longer, and the first of them, the 4th battalion from Stuttgart (7th and 8th panzer), was not created until November 10, 1938. The 7th tank regiment of this brigade was formed on October 1, 1936 in Ohrdruf, but initially there were only three companies in its battalions instead of four; At the same time, the 8th tank regiment was formed in Zossen, for the formation of which forces and means were allocated from the still formed regiments of armored divisions.

Before the formation of the next separate armored brigades, two-battalion armored regiments were created for them, which were independent at that time. October 12, 1937 the formation of the 10th tank battalion in Zinten (now Kornevo, Kaliningrad region), the 11th tank tank in Padeborn (north-west of Kassel), the 15th tank tank in Zhagan and the 25th tank tank in Erlangen, Bavaria. Missing numbers of regiments were used later in the formation of subsequent units, or ... never. Due to constantly changing plans, many regiments simply did not exist.

Further development of the armored forces

In January 1936, a decision was made to motorize four of the existing or emerging infantry divisions so that they could accompany the panzer divisions in battle. These divisions did not have any armored units other than an armored car company in the reconnaissance battalion, but their infantry regiments, artillery and other units received trucks, off-road vehicles, artillery tractors and motorcycles, so that the entire crew and equipment of the division could move on tires, wheels, and not on their own feet, horses or carts. The following were selected for motorization: the 2nd Infantry Division from Szczecin, the 13th Infantry Division from Magdeburg, the 20th Infantry Division from Hamburg and the 29th Infantry Division from Erfurt. The process of their motorization was carried out in 1936, 1937 and partly in 1938.

In June 1936, in turn, it was decided to replace two of the three remaining cavalry divisions of the so-called. light divisions. It was supposed to be a relatively balanced division with one tank battalion, in addition, its organization was supposed to be close to a tank division. The main difference was that in his only battalion there should have been four companies of light tanks without a heavy company, and in a motorized cavalry regiment, instead of two battalions, there should have been three. The task of the light divisions was to conduct reconnaissance on an operational scale, cover the flanks of the maneuver groups and pursue the retreating enemy, as well as cover operations, i.e. almost exactly the same tasks as

performed by the mounted cavalry.

Due to the lack of equipment, light brigades were first formed with an incomplete strength. On the same day that four separate armored regiments were formed - October 12, 1937 - in Sennelager near Paderborn, a separate 65st armored battalion was also formed for the 1th light brigade.

Following the expansion of the armored units, work was carried out on two types of tanks, which were originally supposed to enter heavy companies as part of armored battalions (fourth company), and later become the main equipment of light companies (tanks with a 37 mm gun, later PzKpfw III) and heavy companies (tanks with 75 mm cannon, later PzKpfw IV). Contracts for the development of new vehicles were signed: January 27, 1934 for the development of the PzKpfw III (the name was used since 1938, before that ZW - the camouflage name Zugführerwagen, the platoon commander's vehicle, although it was not a command tank) and February 25, 1935. for the development of PzKpfw IV (until 1938 BW - Begleitwagen - escort vehicle), and serial production began (respectively) in May 1937. and October 1937. fill the gap - PzKpfw II (until 1938 Landwirtschaftlicher Schlepper 100 or LaS 100), also ordered on January 27, 1934, but whose production began in May 1936. From the very beginning, these light tanks were armed with a 20 mm cannon and one machine gun were considered as an addition to the PzKpfw I, and after the production of the corresponding number of PzKpfw III and IV should have been assigned to the role of reconnaissance vehicles. However, until September 1939, PzKpfw I and II dominated the German armored units, with a small number of PzKpfw III and IV vehicles.

In October 1936, 32 PzKpfw I tanks and one commander's PzBefwg I went to Spain as part of a tank battalion of the Condor Legion. The battalion commander was Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm von Thoma. In connection with the replenishment of losses, a total of 4 PzBefwg I and 88 PzKpfw I were sent to Spain, the rest of the tanks were transferred to Spain after the end of the conflict. The Spanish experience was not encouraging - tanks with weak armor, armed only with machine guns and with relatively poor maneuverability, were inferior to enemy combat vehicles, mainly Soviet tanks, some of which (BT-5) were armed with a 45-mm cannon. The PzKpfw I was definitely not suitable for use on a modern battlefield, but was nevertheless used until the beginning of 1942 - out of necessity, in the absence of other tanks in sufficient numbers.

In March 1938 General Guderian's 2nd Panzer Division was used during the occupation of Austria. On March 10, he left the permanent garrison and reached the Austrian border on March 12. Already at this stage, the division lost many vehicles as a result of breakdowns that could not be repaired or towed (the role of repair units was not appreciated at that time). In addition, individual units were mixed up due to the incorrect operation of traffic control and control on the march. The division entered Austria in a chaotic mass, continuing to lose equipment as a result of setbacks; other cars were stuck due to lack of fuel. There were not enough fuel supplies, so they began to use commercial Austrian gas stations, paying with German marks. Nevertheless, practically the shadow of the division reached Vienna, which at that moment completely lost its mobility. Despite these shortcomings, success was trumpeted, and General Guderian received congratulations from Adolf Hitler himself. However, if the Austrians try to defend themselves, the 2nd dancer may pay dearly for his poor preparation.

In November 1938, the next stage in the creation of new armored units began. Most important was the formation of the 10th Division at Würzburg on 4 November, which included the 5th Division of the 35th Panzer Battalion at Bamberg and the 36th Panzer Battalion at Schweinfurt, also created on 10 November 1938. 23rd Panzer in Schwetzingen. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd light brigades were also created, which included the existing 65th brigade and the newly formed 66th and 67th brigades - in Eisenach and Gross-Glinik, respectively. It is worth adding here that after the annexation of Austria in March 1938, the Austrian mobile division was included in the Wehrmacht, which was slightly reorganized and equipped with German equipment (but with the remaining mainly Austrian personnel), becoming the 4th Light Division, with the 33rd tank battalion. Almost simultaneously, by the end of the year, the light brigades were sufficiently manned to be renamed divisions; where they are located: 1. DLek - Wuppertal, 2. DLek - Gera, 3. DLek - Cottbus and 4. DLek - Vienna.

At the same time, in November 1938, the formation of two more independent armored brigades began - the 6th and 8th BP. The 6th BNF, stationed in Würzburg, consisted of the 11th and 25th tanks (already formed), the 8th BNR from Zhagan consisted of the 15th and 31st tanks. Armored General Lutz deliberately intended these brigades to use tanks in close support of the infantry, as opposed to panzer divisions intended for independent maneuvering. However, since 1936, General Lutz was gone. From May 1936 to October 1937, Colonel Werner Kempf served as commander of the High-Speed ​​Forces, and then, until November 1938, Lieutenant General Heinrich von Vietinghoff, General Scheel. In November 1938, Lieutenant General Heinz Guderian became commander of the Fast Troops, and changes began. The formation of the 5th Light Division was immediately discontinued, it was replaced by the 5th Infantry Division (headquarters in Opole), which included the previously independent 8th Infantry Division from Zhagan.

As early as February 1939, General Guderian envisioned the transformation of light divisions into tank divisions and the liquidation of infantry support brigades. One of these brigades was "absorbed" by the 5th Dpanc; There are two more left to give. It is therefore not true that the light divisions were disbanded as a result of the experience of the 1939 Polish campaign. According to Guderian's plan, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th armored divisions were to remain unchanged, 1st and 2nd. DLek were to be converted into (respectively): 3rd, 4th, 6th and 7th Dancers. New divisions, of necessity, had armored brigades as part of a regiment and a separate tank battalion: the 8th Infantry Division - the 9th Polish Armored Division and I. / 6. bpants (former 11th bpants), 12th manor house - 65th manor house and I./7. bpants (former 35th bpants), 34th manor house - 66th manor house and I./8. bpank (former 15th bpank) and 16th division - 67th bpank and I./9. bpanc (in this case it was necessary to form two new tank battalions), but this was facilitated by the absorption of Czech tanks, known in Germany as PzKpfw 33 (t) and the prepared production line of a tank prototype called PzKpfw 32 (t). However, plans to convert light divisions into tank divisions were not implemented until October-November 35.

Already in February 1936, the command of the XVI Army Corps (Armored General Oswald Lutz) was formed in Berlin, which included the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Dancers. It was supposed to become the main striking force of the Wehrmacht. In 1938, the commander of this corps was Lieutenant General Erich Hoepner. However, the corps in this form could not withstand the fighting.

Armored troops in aggression against Poland in 1939

In the period of July-August 1939, German troops were transferred to their starting positions for an attack on Poland. At the same time, in July, the command of a new fast corps, the XNUMXth Army Corps, was formed, with General Heinz Guderian as its commander. The headquarters of the corps was formed in Vienna, but soon ended up in Western Pomerania.

At the same time, the 10th Panzer Division was formed in Prague by "thrown on the tape", which, of necessity, had an incomplete composition and was part of a brigade in the Polish campaign of 1939. 8th PPank, 86. PPZmot, II./29. Artillery reconnaissance battalion. There was also an improvised armored division DPanc "Kempf" (commander Major General Werner Kempf) based on the headquarters of the 4th BPanc, from which the 8th Polish armored division was taken into the 10th infantry division. Therefore, the 7th Polish Armored Division remained in this division, which additionally included the SS regiment "Germany" and the SS artillery regiment. In fact, this division also had the size of a brigade.

Before the aggression against Poland in 1939, the German tank divisions were divided into separate army corps; there were at most two in one building.

Army Group North (Colonel-General Fedor von Bock) had two armies - the 3rd Army in East Prussia (Artillery General Georg von Küchler) and the 4th Army in Western Pomerania (Artillery General Günther von Kluge). As part of the 3rd Army, there was only an improvised DPants "Kempf" of the 11th KA, along with two "regular" infantry divisions (61st and 4th). The 3rd Army included the 2nd SA of General Guderian, including the 20th Panzer Division, the 10th and 8th Panzer Divisions (motorized), and later the improvised 10th Panzer Division was included in it. Army Group South (Colonel General Gerd von Rundstedt) had three armies. The 17th Army (General Johannes Blaskowitz), advancing on the left wing of the main attack, had in the 10th SA only the motorized SS regiment "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" along with two "regular" DPs (1939 and 1st) . The 4th Army (Artillery General Walther von Reichenau), advancing from Lower Silesia in the main direction of the German strike, had the famous XVI SA (Lieutenant General Erich Hoepner) with two "full-blooded" tank divisions (the only such corps in the Polish campaign of 14 AD). ) - 31st and 2nd Panzer Divisions, but diluted with two "regular" infantry divisions (3rd and 13th). The 29th SA (General of Armored Forces Hermann Goth) had the 10th and 1st DLek, the 65th SA (Infantry General Gustav von Wietersheim) and two motorized DPs - the 11th and 14th. 2nd Dlek, which was reinforced by the replacement of its 4th bank by the 3rd Panzer Regiment. In the 5th Army (Colonel-General Wilhelm List), along with two army infantry corps, was the 8th SA (Infantry General Eugen Beyer) with the 28th Panzer Division, the 239th Dleck and the XNUMXth Mountain Infantry Division. In addition, the XNUMXth SA included the XNUMXth Infantry Division and the SS Motorized Regiment "Germania", as well as three "regular" infantry divisions: the XNUMXth, XNUMXth and XNUMXth Infantry Divisions. By the way, the latter was formed four days before the war in Opole, as part of the third wave of mobilization.

In five years the Germans had deployed seven well-trained and well-armed panzer divisions and four light divisions.

The image above shows that the main striking force was the 10th Army, advancing from Lower Silesia through Piotrkow Trybunalski to Warsaw, which had a single corps with two full-fledged armored divisions in the Polish campaign of 1939; all the rest were scattered among the various corps of the individual armies. For aggression against Poland, the Germans used all their tank units at their disposal at that time, and they did it much better than during the Anschluss of Austria.

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